LII.  Of matters to be aimed at there are three classes; and on the other hand there is a corresponding number of things to be avoided.  For there is something which of its own intrinsic force draws us to itself, not catching us by any idea of emolument, but alluring us by its own dignity.  Of this class are virtue, science, truth.  And there is something else which seems desirable, not on account of its own excellence or nature, but on account of its advantage and of the utility to be derived from it—­such as money.  There are also some things formed of parts of these others in combination, which allure us and draw us after them by their own intrinsic character and dignity, and which also hold out some prospect of advantage to us, to induce us to seek it more eagerly, as friendship, and a fair reputation; and from these their opposites will easily be perceived, without our saying anything about them.

But in order that the principle may be explained in the more simple way, the rules which we have laid down shall be enumerated briefly.  For those which belong to the first kind of discussion are called honourable things; those which belong to the second, are called useful things; but this third thing, because it contains some portion of what is honourable, and because the power of what is honourable is the more important part, is perceived to be altogether a compound kind, made up of a twofold division; still it derives its name from its better part, and is called honourable.  From this it follows, that there are these parts in things which are desirable,—­what is honourable, and what is useful.  And these parts in things which are to be avoided,—­what is dishonourable, and what is useless.  Now to these two things there are two other important circumstances to be added,—­necessity and affection:  the one of which is considered with reference to force, the other with reference to circumstances and persons.  Hereafter we will write more explicitly about each separately.  At present we will explain first the principles of what is honourable.

LIII.  That which either wholly or in some considerable portion of it is sought for its own sake, we call honourable:  and as there are two divisions of it, one of which is simple and the other twofold, let us consider the simple one first.  In that kind, then, virtue has embraced all things under one meaning and one name; for virtue is a habit of the mind, consistent with nature, and moderation, and reason.  Wherefore, when we have become acquainted with all its divisions, it will be proper to consider the whole force of simple honesty.