LI.  Definition is when a word is set down in a written document, whose exact meaning is inquired into, in this manner:—­There is a law, “Whoever in a severe tempest desert their ship shall be deprived of all their property; the ship and the cargo shall belong to those men who remain by the ship.”  Two men, when they were sailing on the open sea, and when the ship belonged to one of them and the cargo to another, noticed a shipwrecked man swimming and holding out his hands to them.  Being moved with pity they directed the ship towards him, and took the man into their vessel.  A little afterwards the storm began to toss them also about very violently, to such a degree that the owner of the ship, who was also the pilot, got into a little boat, and from that he guided the ship as well as he could by the rope by which the boat was fastened to the ship, and so towed along; but the man to whom the cargo belonged threw himself on his sword in despair.  On this the shipwrecked man took the helm and assisted the ship as far as he could.  But after the waves went down and the tempest abated, the ship arrived in harbour.  But the man who had fallen on his sword turned out to be but slightly wounded, and easily recovered of his wound.  And then every one of these three men claimed the ship and cargo for his own.  Every one of them relies on the letter of the law to support their claim, and a dispute arises as to the meaning of the words.  For they seek to ascertain by definitions what is the meaning of the expressions “to abandon the ship,” “to stand by the ship,” and even what “the ship” itself is.  And the question must be dealt with with reference to all the same topics as are employed in a statement of the case which turns upon a definition.

Now, having explained all those argumentations which are adapted to the judicial class of causes, we will proceed in regular order to give topics and rules for the deliberative and demonstrative class of arguments; not that there is any cause which is not at all times conversant with some statement of the case or other; but because there are nevertheless some topics peculiar to these causes, not separated from the statement of the case, but adapted to the objects which are more especially kept in view by these kinds of argumentation.

For it seems desirable that in the judicial kind the proper end is equity; that is to say, some division of honesty.  But in the deliberative kind Aristotle thinks that the proper object is expediency; we ourselves, that it is expediency and honesty combined.  In the demonstrative kind it is honesty only.  Wherefore, in this kind of cause also, some kinds of argumentation will be handled in a common manner, and in similar ways to one another.  Some will be discussed more separately with reference to their object, which is what we must always keep in view in every kind of speech.  And we should have no objection to give an example of each kind of statement of the case, if we did not see that, as obscure things are made more plain by speaking of them, so also things which are plain are sometimes made more obscure by a speech.  At present let us go on to precepts of deliberation.