XLIX.  But from contrary laws a controversy arises, when two or more laws appear to be at variance with one another In this manner—­There is a law, “That he who has slain a tyrant shall receive the regard of men who conquer at Olympia, and shall also ask whatever he pleases of the magistrate, and the magistrate shall grant it to him.”  There is also another law—­“When a tyrant is slain, the magistrate shall also put to death his five nearest relations.”  Alexander, who was the tyrant of Pherse, a city in Thessaly, was slain by his own wife, whose name was Thebe, at night, when he was in bed with her, she, as a reward, demands the liberty of her son whom she had by the tyrant.  Some say that according to this law that son ought to be put to death.  The matter is referred to a court of justice.  Now in a case of this kind the same topics and the same rules will suit each side of the question, because each party is bound to establish his own law, and to invalidate the one contrary to it.  First of all, therefore, it is requisite to show the nature of the laws, by considering which law has reference to more important, that is to say, to more honourable and more necessary matters.  From which it results, that if two or more, or ever so many laws cannot all be maintained, because they are at variance with one another, that one ought to be considered the most desirable to be maintained, which appears to have reference to the most important matters.  Then comes the question also, which law was passed last; for the newest law is the most important.  And also, which law enjoins anything, and which merely allows it; for that which is enjoined is necessary, that which is allowed is optional.  Also one must consider by which law a penalty is appointed for the violation of it; or which has the heaviest penalty attached to it; for that law must be the most carefully maintained which is sanctioned by the most severe penalties.  Again, one must inquire which law enjoins, and which forbids anything; for it often happens that the law which forbids something appears by some exception as it were to amend the law which commands something.  Then, too, it is right to consider which law comprehends the entire class of subjects to which it refers, and which embraces only a part of the question; which may be applied generally to many classes of questions, and which appears to have been framed to apply to some special subject.  For that which has been drawn up with reference to some particular division of a subject, or for some special purpose, appears to come nearer to the subject under discussion, and to have more immediate connexion with the present action.  Then arises the question, which is the thing which according to the law must be done immediately; which will admit of some delay or slackness in the execution.  For it is right that that should be done first which must be done immediately.  In the next place, it is well to take pains that the law one is advocating shall appear to depend on its