And he will do himself a great deal of good if he shows that he himself, when in power, was merciful and inclined to pardon others.  And the offence of which he is now accused must be extenuated and made to appear as trifling as possible; and it must be shown to be discreditable, or at all events inexpedient, to punish such a man as he is.  After that it will be advisable to seek to move pity by use of common topics, according to those rules which have been laid down in the first book.

XXXVI.  But the adversary will exaggerate the offences; he will say that nothing was done ignorantly, but that everything was the result of deliberate wickedness and cruelty.  He will show that the accused person has been pitiless, arrogant, and (if he possibly can) at all times disaffected, and that he cannot by any possibility be rendered friendly.  If he mentions any services done by him, he will prove that they were done for some private object, and not out of any good will; or else he will prove that he has conceived hatred since or else that all those services have been effaced by his frequent offences, or else that his services are of less importance than his injuries, or that, as he has already received adequate honours for his services, he ought also to have punishment inflicted on him for the injuries which he has committed.  In the next place, he will urge that it is discreditable or pernicious that he should be pardoned.  And besides that, it will be the very extremity of folly not to avail oneself of one’s power over a man, over whom one has often wished to have power, and that it is proper to consider what feelings, or rather what hatred they ought to entertain towards him.  But one common topic to be employed will be indignation at his offence, and another will be the argument, that it is right to pity those who are in distress, owing to misfortune, and not those who are in such a plight through their own wickedness.

Since, then, we have been dwelling so long on the general statement of the case, on account of the great number of its divisions, in order to prevent any one’s mind from being so distracted by the variety and dissimilarity of circumstances, and so led into some errors, it appears right also to remind the reader of what remains to be mentioned of that division of the subject, and why it remains.  We have said, that that was the juridical sort of examination in which the nature of right and wrong, and the principles of reward and punishment, were investigated.  We have explained the causes in which inquiry into right and wrong is proceeded with.  It remains now to explain the principles which regulate the distribution of rewards and punishments.