treaty, sanctioned with the most formal solemnities of religion, you ought to be surrendered.”  The question for the judges to decide is “Whether, since a man who had no official authority was present, by the command of the general, aiding and abetting in the adopting of the treaty, and in that important religious ceremony, he ought to be surrendered to the enemy or not.”  This kind of question is so far different from the previous one, because in that the accused person admits that he ought to have done what the prosecutor says ought to have been done, but he attributes the cause to some particular circumstance or person, which was a hindrance to his own intention, without having recourse to any admission.  For that has greater force, which will be understood presently.  But in this case a man ought not to accuse the opposite party, nor to attempt to transfer the criminality to another, but he ought to show that that has not and never has had any reference whatever to himself, either in respect of power or duty.  And in this kind of cause there is this new circumstance, that the prosecutor often works up a fresh accusation out of the topics employed, to remove the guilt from the accused person.  As for instance,—­“If any one accuses a man who, while he was praetor, summoned the people to take up arms for an expedition, at a time when the consuls were in the city.”  For as in the previous instance the accused person showed that the matter in question had no connexion with his duty or his power, so in this case also, the prosecutor himself, by removing the action done from the duty and power of the person who is put on his trial, confirms the accusation by this very argument.  And in this case it will be proper for each party to examine, by means of all the divisions of honour and expediency, by examples, and tokens, and by arguing what is the duty, or right, or power of each individual, and whether he had that right, and duty, and power which is the subject of the present discussion, or not.  But it will be desirable for common topics to be assumed from the case itself, if there is any room in it for expressions of indignation or complaint.

XXI.  The admission of the fact takes place, when the accused person does not justify the fact itself, but demands to be pardoned for it.  And the parts of this division of the case are two:  purgation and deprecation.  Purgation is that by which (not the action, but) the intention of the person who is accused, is defended.  That has three subdivisions,—­ignorance, accident, necessity.

Ignorance is when the person who is accused declares that he did not know something or other.  As, “There was a law in a certain nation that no one should sacrifice a calf to Diana.  Some sailors, when in a terrible tempest they were being tossed about in the open sea, made a vow that if they reached the harbour which they were in sight of, they would sacrifice a calf to the god who presided over that place.  Being ignorant of the law, when they landed,