ought not, with reference to the honourableness of the proceeding.  We will consider each part more minutely when talking of the deliberative kind of argument.  Then he will say, that everything was done by the accused person which depended on his own power; that less was done than ought to have been, was the consequence of the fault of another person.  After that, in pointing out the criminality of that other person, it will be requisite to show how great the good will and zeal of the accused person himself was.  And that must be established by proofs of this sort—­by his diligence in all the rest of the affair, by his previous actions, or by his previous expressions.  And it may be well to show that it would have been advantageous to the man himself to have done this, and disadvantageous not to have done it, and that to have done it would have been more in accordance with the rest of his life, than the not having done it, which, was owing to the fault of the other party.

XXX But if the criminality is not to be transferred to some particular person, but to some circumstance, as in this very case—­“If the quaestor had been dead, and on that account the money had not been given to the ambassadors,” then, as the accusation of the other party, and the denial of the fault is removed, it will be desirable to employ the other topics in a similar manner, and to assume whatever is suitable to one’s purpose from the divisions of admitted facts.  But common topics are usually nearly the same to both parties, and then, after the previous topics are taken for granted, will suit either to the greatest certainty.  The accuser will use the topic of indignation at the fact, the defender, when the guilt belongs to another and does not attach to himself, will urge that he does not deserve to have any punishment inflicted on him.

But the removal of the criminality from oneself is effected when the accused person declares, that what is attributed to him as a crime did not affect him or his duty, and asserts that if there was any criminality in it, it ought not to be attributed to him.  That kind of dispute is of this sort—­“In the treaty which was formerly made with the Samnites, a certain young man of noble birth held the pig which was to be sacrificed, by the command of the general.  But when the treaty was disavowed by the senate, and the general surrendered to the Samnites, one of the senators asserted that the man who held the pig ought also to be given up.”  The charge is, “He ought to be given up.”  The denial is, “He ought not.”  The question is, “Whether he ought or not.”  The reason is, “For it was no particular duty of mine, nor did it depend on my power, being as young as I was, and only a private individual, and while the general was present with the supreme authority and command, to take care that the treaty was solemnised with all the regular formalities.”  The argument to invalidate this reason is, “But since you became an accomplice in a most infamous