Now let us consider the juridical kind of inquiry and its different divisions.  XXIII The juridical inquiry is that in which the nature of justice and injustice, and the principle of reward or punishment, is examined.  Its divisions are two, one of which we call the absolute inquiry, and the other the one which is accessory.  That is the absolute inquiry which itself contains in itself the question of right and not right, not as the inquiry about facts does, in an overhand and obscure manner, but openly and intelligibly.  It is of this sort.—­When the Thebans had defeated the Lacedaemonians in war, as it was nearly universal custom among the Greeks, when they were waging war against one another, for those who were victorious to erect some trophy on their borders, for the sake only of declaring their victory at present, not that it might remain for ever as a memorial of the war, they erected a brazen trophy.  They are accused before the Amphictyons, that is, before the common council of Greece.  The charge is, “They ought not to have done so.”  The denial is, “We ought.”  The question is, “Whether they ought.”  The reason is, “For we gained such glory by our valour in that war, that we wished to leave an everlasting memorial of it to posterity.”  The argument adduced to invalidate this is, “But still it is not right for Greeks to erect an eternal memorial of then enmity to Greeks.”  The question to be decided is, “As for the sake of celebrating their own excessive valour Greeks have erected an imperishable monument of their enmity to Greeks, whether they have done well or ill?” We, therefore, have now put this reason in the mouth of the Thebans, in order that this class of cause which we are now considering might be thoroughly understood.  For if we had furnished them with that argument which is perhaps the one which they actually used, “We did so because our enemies warred against us without any considerations of justice and piety,” we should then be digressing to the subject of retorting an accusation, of which we will speak hereafter.  But it is manifest that both kinds of question are incidental to this controversy.  And arguments must be derived for it from the same topics as those which are applicable to the cause depending on matters of fact, which has been all ready treated of.  But to take many weighty common topics both from the cause itself, if there is any opportunity for employing the language of indignation or complaint, and also from the advantage and general character of the law, will be not only allowable, but proper, if the dignity of the cause appears to require such expedients.

XXIV.  At present let us consider the assumptive portion of the juridical inquiry.  But it is then called assumptive, when the fact cannot be proved by its own intrinsic evidence, but is defended by some argument brought from extraneous circumstances.  Its divisions are four in number:  comparison, the retort of the accusation, the refutation of it as far as regards oneself, and concession.