but a sort of innate instinct that implants in us, as religion, piety, revenge for injuries, gratitude, attention to superiors, and truth.  They call religion, that which is conversant with the fear of, and ceremonious observance paid to the gods; they call that piety, which warns us to fulfil our duties towards our country, our parents, or others connected with us by ties of blood, gratitude is that which retains a recollection of honours and benefits conferred on one, and acts of friendship done to one, and which shows itself by a requital of good offices, revenge for injuries is that by which we repel violence and insult from ourselves and from those who ought to be dear to us, by defending or avenging ourselves, and by means of which we punish offences, attention to superiors, they call the feeling under the influence of which we feel reverence for and pay respect to those who excel us in wisdom or honour or in any dignity, truth, they style that habit by which we take care that nothing has been or shall be done in any other manner than what we state.  And the laws of nature themselves are less inquired into in a controversy of this sort, because they have no particular connexion with the civil law of which we are speaking and also, because they are somewhat remote from ordinary understandings.  Still it is often desirable to introduce them for the purpose of some comparison, or with a view to add dignity to the discussion.

But the laws of habit are considered to be those which without any written law, antiquity has sanctioned by the common consent of all men.  And with reference to this habit there are some laws which are now quite fixed by their antiquity.  Of which sort there are many other laws also, and among them far the greatest part of those laws which the praetors are in the habit of including in their edicts.  But some kinds of law have already been established by certain custom, such as those relating to covenants, equity, formal decisions.  A covenant is that which is agreed upon between two parties, because it is considered to be so just that it is said to be enforced by justice, equity is that which is equal to all men, a formal decision is that by which something has been established by the declared opinion of some person or persons authorized to pronounce one.  As for regular laws, they can only be ascertained from the laws.  It is desirable, then, by trying over every part of the law, to take notice of and to extract from these portions of the law whatever shall appear to arise out of the case itself, or out of a similar one, or out of one of greater or less importance.  But since, as has been already said, there are two kinds of common topics, one of which contains the amplification of a doubtful matter, and the other of a certain one, we must consider what the case itself suggests, and what can be and ought to be amplified by a common topic.  For certain topics to suit every possible case cannot be laid down, and perhaps in most of them it will be necessary at times to rely on the authority of the lawyers, and at times to speak against it.  But we must consider, in this case and in all cases, whether the case itself suggests any common topics besides those which we have mentioned.