as long as the latter was a minor, wherefore it is quite clear that the things which belonged to the son are now ours, according to the will of the father.”  The argument to upset this is—­“Aye, the father made his own will, and appointed you as reversionary heir, not to his son, but himself.  Wherefore, nothing except what belonged to him himself can be yours by his will.”  The point to be determined is, whether any one can make a will to affect the property of his son who is a minor, or, whether the reversionary heirs of the father of the family himself, are not the heirs of his son also as long as he is a minor.  And it is not foreign to the subject, (in order that I may not, on the one hand, omit to mention it, or, on the other, keep continually repeating it,) to mention a thing here which has a bearing on many questions.  There are causes which have many reasons, though the grounds of the cause are simple, and that is the case when what has been done, or what is being defended, may appear right or natural on many different accounts, as in this very cause.  For this further reason may be suggested by the heirs—­“For there cannot be more heirs than one of one property, for causes quite dissimilar, nor has it ever happened, that one man was heir by will, and another by law, of the same property.”  This, again, is what will be replied, in order to invalidate this—­“It is not one property only; because one part of it was the adventitious property of the minor, whose heir no one had been appointed by will at that time, in the case of anything happening to the minor, and with respect to the other portion of the property, the inclination of the father, even after he was dead, had the greatest weight, and that, now that the minor is dead, gives the property to his own heirs.”

The question to be decided is, “Whether it was one property?” And then, if they employ this argument by way of invalidating the other, “That there can be many heirs of one property for quite dissimilar causes,” the question to be decided arises out of that argument, namely “Whether there can be more heirs than one, of different classes and character, to one property?”

XXII Therefore, in one statement of the case, it has been understood how there are more reasons than one, more topics than one to invalidate such reasons, and besides that, more questions than one for the decision of the judge.  Now let us look to the rules for this class of question.  We must consider in what the rights of each party, or of all the parties (if there are many parties to the suit), consist.  The beginning, then, appears derived from nature; but some things seem to have become adopted in practice for some consideration of expediency which is either more or less evident to us.  But afterwards things which were approved of, or which seemed useful, either through habit, or because of their truth, appeared to have been confirmed by laws, and some things seem to be a law of nature, which it is not any vague opinion,