XVIII Now, if there be more matters to be defined,—­as for instance, if we inquire whether he is a thief or a sacrilegious person who has stolen sacred vessels from a private house,—­we shall have to employ many definitions, and then the whole cause will have to be dealt with on a similar principle.  But it is a common topic to dwell on the wickedness of that man who endeavours to wrest to his own purposes not only the effect of things, but also the meaning of words, in order both to do as he pleases, and to call what he does by whatever name he likes.

Then the first topic to be used by an advocate for the defence, is also a brief and plain definition of a name, adopted in accordance with the opinion of men.  In this way—­To diminish the majesty of the people is to usurp some of the public powers when you are not invested with any office.  And then the confirmation of this definition is derived from similar instances and similar principles.  Afterwards comes the separation of one’s own action from that definition.  Then comes the common topic by which the expediency or honesty of the action is increased.

Then comes the reprehension of the definition of the opposite party, which is also derived from all the same topics as those which we have prescribed to the accuser.  And afterwards other arguments will be adduced besides the common topic.  But that will be a common topic for the advocate of the defence to use, by which he will express indignation that the accuser not only alters facts in order to bring him into danger, but that he attempts also to alter words.  For those common topics which are assumed either for the purpose of demonstrating the falsehood of the accusations of the prosecutor, or for exciting pity, or for expressing indignation at an action, or for the purpose of deterring people from showing pity, are derived from the magnitude of the danger, not from the nature of the cause.  Wherefore they are incidental not to every cause, but to every description of cause.  We have made mention of them in speaking of the conjectural statement of a case, but we shall use induction when the cause requires.

XIX But when the pleading appears to require some translation, or to need any alteration, either because he is not pleading who ought to do so, or he is not pleading with the man he ought, or before the men whom he ought to have for hearers, or in accordance with the proper law, or under liability to the proper punishment, or in reference to the proper accusation, or at the proper time, it is then called a transferable statement of the case.  We should require many examples of this if we were to inquire into every sort of translation, but because the principle on which the rules proceed is similar, we have no need of a superfluity of instances.  And in our usual practice it happens from many causes that such translations occur but seldom.  For many actions are prevented by the exceptions allowed by the praetors, and we