which I legitimately had over my own son.”  The denial of this argument is—­“But a man who, by the power belonging to him as a father, that is to say, as a private individual, attacks the power of a tribune of the people, that is to say, the power of the people itself, attacks the majesty of the people.”  The question for the judges is—­“Whether a man attacks the majesty of the people who uses his power as a father in opposition to the power of a tribune?” And all the arguments must be brought to bear on this question.

And, that no one may suppose by any chance that we are not aware that some other statement of the case may perhaps be applicable to this cause, we are taking that portion only for which we are going to give rules.  But when all parts have been explained in this book, any one, if he will only attend diligently, will see every sort of statement in every sort of cause, and all their parts, and all the discussions which are incidental to them.  For we shall mention them all.

The first topic then for an accuser is a short and plain definition, and one in accordance with the general opinion of men, of that name, the meaning of which is the subject of inquiry.  In this manner—­“To attack the majesty of the people is to detract from the dignity, or the rank, or the power of the people, or of those men to whom the people has given power.”  This definition being thus briefly set forth in words, must be confirmed by many assertions and reasons and must be shown to be such as you have described it.  Afterwards it will be desirable to add to the definition which you have given, the action of the man who is accused, and to add it too with reference to the character which you have proved it to have.  Take for instance—­“to attack the majesty of the people.”  You must show that the adversary does attack the majesty of the people, and you must confirm this whole topic by a common topic, by which the atrocity or indignity of the fact, and the whole guilt of it, and also our indignation at it, may be increased.

After that it will be desirable to invalidate the definition of the adversaries, but that will be invalidated if it be proved to be false.  This proof must be deduced from the belief of men concerning it, when we consider in what manner and under what circumstances men are accustomed to use that expression in their ordinary writing or talking.  It will also be invalidated if the proof of that description be shown to be discreditable or useless, and if it be shown what disadvantages will ensue if that position be once admitted.  And it will be derived from the divisions of honour and usefulness, concerning which we will give rules when we lay down a system of deliberations.  And if we compare the definition given by our adversaries with our own definition, and prove our own to be true, and honourable, and useful, and theirs to be entirely different.  But we shall seek out things like them in an affair of either greater, or less, or equal importance, from which our description will be proved.