That is an adverse definition, which in some particular is an actual injury to one’s own cause; as if any one were to extol the power, and resources, and prosperity of the enemy, while encouraging his own soldiers to fight.  If some part of the argumentation is not adapted to the object which is or ought to be proposed to one, it will be found to be owing to some one of these defects.  If a man has promised a great many points and proved only a few; or if, when he is bound to prove the whole, he speaks only of some portion; in this way:—­The race of women is avaricious; for Eriphyle sold the life of her husband for gold.  Or if he does not speak in defence of that particular point which is urged in accusation; as if any one when accused of corruption were to defend himself by the statement that he was brave; as Amphion does in Euripides, and so too in Pacuvius, who, when his musical knowledge is found fault with, praises his knowledge of philosophy.  Or if a part of conduct be found fault with on account of the bad character of the man; as if any one were to blame learning on account of the vices of some learned men.  Or if any one while wishing to praise somebody were to speak of his good fortune, and not of his virtue; or if any one were to compare one thing with another in such a manner as to think that he was not praising the one unless he was blaming the other; or if he were to praise the one in such a manner as to omit all mention of the other.

Or if, when an inquiry is being carried on respecting one particular point, the speech is addressed to common topics; as if any one, while men are deliberating whether war shall be waged or not, were to devote himself wholly to the praises of peace, and not to proving that that particular war is inexpedient.  Or if a false reason for anything be alleged, in this way:—­Money is good because it is the thing which, above all others, makes life happy.  Or if one is alleged which is invalid, as Plautus says:—­

“Sure to reprove a friend for evident faults Is but a thankless office; still ’tis useful, And wholesome for a youth of such an age, And so this day I will reprove my friend, Whose fault is palpable.”—­Plautus, Frinummus, Act i. sc. 2, l.1.

Or in this manner, if a man were to say, “Avarice is the greatest evil; for the desire of money causes great distress to numbers of people.”  Or it is unsuitable, in this manner:—­“Friendship is the greatest good for there are many pleasures in friendship.”

LI.  The fourth manner of reprehension was stated to be that by which, in opposition to a solid argumentation, one equally, or still more solid, has been advanced.  And this kind of argumentation is especially employed in deliberations when we admit that something which is said in opposition to us is reasonable, but still prove that that conduct which we are defending is necessary; or when we confess that the line of conduct which they are advocating is useful, and prove that what we ourselves are contending for is honourable.  And we have thought it necessary to say thus much about reprehension; now we will lay down some rules respecting the conclusion.