“Oh that the woodman’s axe had spared the pine
  That long on Pelion’s lofty summit grew."[57]

For the cause is sought further back than is at all necessary.  That is a bad definition, when it either describes common things in this manner:—­“He is seditious who is a bad and useless citizen;” for this does not describe the character of a seditious man more than of an ambitious one,—­of a calumniator, than of any wicked man whatever, in short.  Or when it says anything which is false; in this manner:—­“Wisdom is a knowledge how to acquire money.”  Or when it contains something which is neither dignified nor important; in this way:—­“Folly is a desire of inordinate glory.”  That, indeed, is one folly; but this is defining folly by a species, not by its whole genus.  It is controvertible when a doubtful cause is alleged, for the sake of proving a doubtful point; in this manner:—­

  “See how the gods who rule the realms above
  And shades below, and all their motions sway,
  Themselves are all in tranquil concord found.”

That is self-evident, about which there is no dispute at all.  As if any one while accusing Orestes were to make it quite plain that his mother had been put to death by him.  That is a disputable definition, when the very thing which we are amplifying is a matter in dispute.  As if any one, while accusing Ulysses, were to dwell on this point particularly, that it is a scandalous thing that the bravest of men, Ajax, should have been slain by a most inactive man.  That is discreditable which either with respect to the place in which it is spoken, or to the man who utters it, or to the time at which it is uttered, or to those who hear it, or to the matter which is the subject of discussion, appears scandalous on account of the subject being a discreditable one.  That is an offensive one, which offends the inclinations of those who hear it; as if any one were to praise the judiciary law of Caepio before the Roman knights, who are themselves desirous of acting as judges.

L. That is a contrary definition, which is laid down in opposition to the actions which those who are the hearers of the speech have done; as if any one were to be speaking before Alexander the Great against some stormer of a city, and were to say that nothing was more inhuman than to destroy cities, when Alexander himself had destroyed Thebes.  That is an inconsistent one, which is asserted by the same man in different senses concerning the same case; as if any one, after he has said that the man who has virtue is in need of nothing whatever for the purpose of living well, were afterwards to deny that any one could live well without good health; or that he would stand by a friend in difficulty out of good-will towards him, for that then he would hope that some good would accrue to himself by so doing.