ascertained; nor should we permit Epaminondas, not even if he were beyond the power of this tribunal, to interpret to us the meaning of the law; much less will we now permit him, when, the law is at hand, to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, not from that which is most clearly written, but from that which is convenient for his own cause.  But if you, O judges, are bound to obey the laws, and if you are unable to do so unless you follow what is written in the law; what can hinder your deciding that he has acted contrary to the laws?”

But if we pass over the proof of the assumption, again the argumentation will be arranged under four heads, in this manner:—­“When men have repeatedly deceived us, having pledged their faith to us, we ought not to give credit to anything that they say for if we receive any injury; in consequence of their perfidy, there will be no one except ourselves whom we shall have any right to accuse.  And in the first place, it is inconvenient to be deceived, in the next place, it is foolish, thirdly, it is disgraceful.  But the Carthaginians have before this deceived us over and over again.  It is therefore the greatest insanity to rest any hopes on their good faith, when you have been so often deceived by their treachery.”

When the proof both of the proposition and of the assumption is passed over, the argumentation becomes threefold only, in this way—­“We must either live in fear of the Carthaginians if we leave them with their power undiminished, or we must destroy their city.  And certainly it is not desirable to live in fear of them.  The only remaining alternative then is to destroy their city.”

XL But some people think that it is both possible and advisable at times to pass over the summing up altogether, when it is quite evident what is effected by ratiocination.  And then if that be done they consider that the argumentation is limited to two divisions, in this way—­“If she has had a child she is not a virgin.  But she has had a child.”  In this case they say it is quite sufficient to state the proposition and assumption, since it is quite plain that the matter which is here stated is such as does not stand in need of summing up.  But to us it seems that all ratiocination ought to be terminated in proper form and that that defect which offends them is above all things to be avoided namely, that of introducing what is self evident into the summing up.

But this will be possible to be effected if we come to a right understanding of the different kinds of summing up.  For we shall either sum up in such a way as to unite together the proposition and the assumption, in this way—­“But if it is right for all laws to be referred to the general advantage of the republic, and if this man ensured the safety of the republic, undoubtedly he cannot by one and the same action have consulted the general safety and yet have violated the laws,”—­or thus, in order that the opinion we advocate may be