Those who have thought it profitable to pay diligent attention to this kind of reasoning, have differed a little in the manner in which they have laid down rules, though they were aiming at the same end as far as the practice of speaking went.  For some of them have said that there are five divisions of it, and some have thought that it had no more parts than could be arranged under three divisions.  And it would seem not useless to explain the dispute which exists between these parties, with the reasons which each allege for it; for it is a short one, and not such that either party appears to be talking nonsense.  And this topic also appears to us to be one that it is not at all right to omit in speaking.

Those who think that it ought to be arranged in five divisions, say that first of all it is desirable to explain the sum of the discussion, in this way:—­Those things are better managed which are done on some deliberate plan, than those which are conducted without any steady design.  This they call the first division.  And then they think it right that it should be further proved by various arguments, and by as copious statements as possible; in this way:—­“That house which is governed by reason is better appointed in all things, and more completely furnished, than that which is conducted at random, and on no settled plan;—­that army which is commanded by a wise and skilful general, is governed more suitably in all particulars than that which is managed by the folly and rashness of any one.  The same principle prevails with respect to sailing; for that ship performs its voyage best which has the most experienced pilot.”

When the proposition has been proved in this manner, and when two parts of the ratiocination have proceeded, they say in the third part, that it is desirable to assume, from the mere intrinsic force of the proposition, what you wish to prove; in this way:—­“But none of all those things is managed better than the entire world.”  In the fourth division they adduce besides another argument in proof of this assumption, in this manner:—­“For both the rising and setting of the stars preserve some definite order, and their annual commutations do not only always take place in the same manner by some express necessity, but they are also adapted to the service of everything, and their daily and nightly changes have never injured anything in any particular from being altered capriciously.”  And all these things are a token that the nature of the world has been arranged by no ordinary wisdom.  In the fifth division they bring forward that sort of statement, which either adduces that sort of fact alone which is compelled in every possible manner, in this way:—­“The world, therefore, is governed on some settled plan;” or else, when it has briefly united both the proposition and the assumption, it adds this which is derived from both of them together, in this way:—­“But if those things are managed better which are conducted on a settled plan, than those which are conducted without such settled plan; and if nothing whatever is managed better than the entire world; therefore it follows that the world is managed on a settled plan.”  And in this way they think that such argumentation has five divisions.