Now what is similar arises out of a species admitting of comparisons.  Now what admits of comparisons is estimated by a nature which may be compared with it, and likened to it.  What is contrary, is what is placed in a different class and is as distant as possible from that thing to which it is called contrary, as cold is from heat and death from life.  But that is negatively opposed to a thing which is separated from the thing by an opposition which is limited to a denial of the quality; in this way, “to be wise,” and “not to be wise.”  That is a genus which embraces several species, as “Cupidity.”  That is a species which is subordinate to a genus, as “Love,” “Avarice.”  The Result is the ultimate termination of any business; in which it is a common inquiry, what has resulted from each separate fact; what is resulting from it; what is likely to result from it.  Wherefore, in order that that which is likely to happen may be more conveniently comprehended in the mind with respect to this genus, we ought first to consider what is accustomed to result from every separate circumstance; in this manner:—­From arrogance, hatred usually results; and from insolence, arrogance.

The fourth division is a natural consequence from those qualities, which we said were usually attributed to things in distinction from persons.  And with respect to this, those circumstances are sought for which ensue from a thing being done.  In the first place, by what name it is proper that that which has been done should be called.  In the next place, who have been the chief agents in, or originators of that action; and last of all, who have been the approvers and the imitators of that precedent and of that discovery.  In the next place, whether there is any regular usage established with regard to that case, or whether there is any regular rule bearing on that case, or any regular course of proceeding, any formal decision, any science reduced to rules, any artificial system.  In the next place, whether its nature is in the habit of being ordinarily displayed, or whether it is so very rarely, and whether it is quite unaccustomed to be so.  After that, whether men are accustomed to approve of such a case with their authority, or to be offended at such actions; and with what eyes they look upon the other circumstances which are in the habit of following any similar conduct, either immediately or after an interval.  And in the very last place, we must take notice whether any of those circumstances which are rightly classed under honesty or utility ensue.  But as to these matters it will be necessary to speak more clearly when we come to mention the deliberative kind of argument.  And the circumstances which we have now mentioned are those which are usually attributed to things as opposed to persons.