But a deliberative argument, both as to the same portion of it and also at the same time, very frequently has a statement of its case both conjectural, and general, and definitive, and in the nature of a demurrer; and at times it contains only one statement, and at times it contains many such.  Therefore it is not itself a statement of the case, nor a division of such statement:  and the same thing must be the case with respect to demonstration.  These, then, as I have said before, must be considered kinds of argument, and not divisions of any statement of the subject.

XI.  This statement of the case then, which we call the general one, appears to us to have two divisions,—­one judicial and one relating to matters of fact.  The judicial one is that in which the nature of right and wrong, or the principles of reward and punishment, are inquired into.  The one relating to matters of fact is that in which the thing taken into consideration is what is the law according to civil precedent, and according to equity; and that is the department in which lawyers are considered by us to be especially concerned.

And the judicial kind is itself also distributed under two divisions,—­one absolute, and one which takes in something besides as an addition, and which may be called assumptive.  The absolute division is that which of itself contains in itself an inquiry into right and wrong.  The assumptive one is that which of itself supplies no firm ground for objection, but which takes to itself some topics for defence derived from extraneous circumstances.  And its divisions are four,—­concession, removal of the accusation from oneself, a retorting of the accusation, and comparison.  Concession when the person on his trial does not defend the deed that has been done, but entreats to be pardoned for it:  and this again is divided into two parts,—­purgation and deprecation.  Purgation is when the fact is admitted, but when the guilt of the fact is sought to be done away.  And this may be on three grounds,—­of ignorance, of accident, or of necessity.  Deprecation is when the person on his trial confesses that he has done wrong, and that he has done wrong on purpose, and nevertheless entreats to be pardoned.  But this kind of address can be used but very rarely.  Removal of the accusation from oneself is when the person on his trial endeavours by force of argument and by influence to remove the charge which is brought against him from himself to another, so that it may not fix him himself with any guilt at all.  And that can be done in two ways,—­if either the cause of the deed, or the deed itself, is attributed to another.  The cause is attributed to another when it is said that the deed was done in consequence of the power and influence of another; but the deed itself is attributed to another when it is said that another either might have done it, or ought to have done it.  The retorting of an accusation takes place when what is done is said to have been lawfully done because another had previously provoked the doer wrongfully.  Comparison is, when it is argued that some other action has been a right or an advantageous one, and then it is contended that this deed which is now impeached was committed in order to facilitate the accomplishment of that useful action.