alone, or there are all three kinds, the judicial and the demonstrative and the deliberative.  Now, to say there is no kind of argument at the same time that he says that there are many arguments, and is giving precepts for them, is foolishness.  How, too, is it possible that there should be one kind only, namely the judicial, when deliberation and demonstration in the first place do not resemble one another, and are exceedingly different from the judicial kind, and have each their separate object to which they ought to be referred.  It follows, then, that there are three kinds of arguments.  Deliberation and demonstration cannot properly be considered divisions of any kind of argument.  He was wrong, therefore, when he said that they were divisions of a general statement of the case.

X. But if they cannot properly be considered divisions of a kind of argument, much less can they properly be considered divisions of a division of an argument.  But all statement of the case is a division of an argument.  For the argument is not adapted to the statement of the case, but the statement of the case is adapted to the argument.  But demonstration and deliberation cannot be properly considered divisions of a kind of argument, because they are separate kinds of arguments themselves.  Much less can they properly be considered divisions of that division, as he calls them.  In the next place, if the statement of the case, both itself as a whole; and also any portion of that statement, is a repelling of an accusation, then that which is not a repelling of an accusation is neither a statement of a case, nor a portion of a statement of a case; but if that which is not a repelling of an attack is not a statement of a case, nor a portion of a statement of a case, then deliberation and demonstration are neither a statement of a case, nor a portion of a statement of a case.  If, therefore, a statement of a case, whether it be the whole statement or some portion of it, be a repelling of an accusation, then deliberation and demonstration are neither a statement of a case, nor any portion of such statement.  But he himself asserts that it is a repelling of an accusation.  He must therefore assert also that demonstration and deliberation are neither a statement of a case, nor a portion of such a statement.  And he will be pressed by the same argument whether he calls the statement of a case the original assertion of his cause by the accuser, or the first speech in answer to such accusation by the advocate of the defence.  For all the same difficulties will attend him in either case.

In the next place a conjectural argument cannot, as to the same portion of it, be at the same time both a conjectural one and a definitive one.  Again, a definitive argument cannot, as to the same portion of it, be at the same time both a definitive argument and one in the form and character of a demurrer.  And altogether, no statement of a case, and no portion of such a statement, can at one and the same time both have its own proper force and also contain the force of another kind of argument.  Because each kind of argument is considered simply by its own merits, and according to its own nature; and if any other kind be united with it, then it is the number of statements of a case that is doubled, and not the power of the statement that is increased.