And a dispute as to fact may be distributed over every sort of time.  For as to what has been done, an inquiry can be instituted in this way—­“whether Ulysses slew Ajax;” and as to what is being done, in this way—­“whether the people of Tregellae are well affected towards the Roman people;” and as to what is going to happen, in this way—­“if we leave Carthage uninjured, whether any inconvenience will accrue to the republic.”

It is a dispute about a name, when parties are agreed as to the fact, and when the question is by what name that which has been done is to be designated.  In which class of dispute it is inevitable on that account that there should be a dispute as to the name; not because the parties are not agreed about the fact, not because the fact is not notorious, but because that which has been done appears in a different light to different people, and on that account one calls it by one name and another by another.  Wherefore, in disputes of this kind the matter must be defined by words, and described briefly; as, for instance, if any one has stolen any sacred vessel from a private place, whether he is to be considered a sacrilegious person, or a simple thief.  For when that is inquired into, it is necessary to define both points—­what is a thief, and what is a sacrilegious person,—­and to show by one’s own description that the matter which is under discussion ought to be called by a different name from that which the opposite party apply to it.  IX.  The dispute about kind is, when it is agreed both what has been done, and when there is no question as to the name by which it ought to be designated; and nevertheless there is a question of what importance the matter is, and of what sort it is, and altogether of what character it is; in this way,—­whether it be just or unjust; whether it be useful or useless; and as to all other circumstances with reference to which there is any question what is the character of that which has been done, without there being any dispute as to its name.  Humagoras assigned four divisions to this sort of dispute:  the deliberative, the demonstrative, the judicial, and the one relating to facts.  And, as it seems to us, this was no ordinary blunder of his, and one which it is incumbent on us to reprove; though we may do so briefly, lest, if we were to pass it over in silence, we might be thought to have had no good reason for abandoning his guidance; or if we were to dwell too long on this point, we might appear to have interposed a delay and an obstacle to the other precepts which we wish to lay down.

If deliberation and demonstration are kinds of causes, then the divisions of any one kind cannot rightly be considered causes; for the same matter may appear to be a class to one person, and a division to another; but it cannot appear both a class and a division to the same person.  But deliberation and demonstration are kinds of argument; for either there is no kind of argument at all, or there is the judicial kind