The demonstrative is that which concerns itself with the praise or blame of some particular individual; the deliberative is that which, having its place in discussion and in political debate, comprises a deliberate statement of one’s opinion; the judicial is that which, having its place in judicial proceedings, comprehends the topics of accusation and defence; or of demand and refusal.  And, as our own opinion at least inclines, the art and ability of the orator must be understood to be conversant with these tripartite materials.  Vi For Hermagoras, indeed, appears neither to attend to what he is saying, nor to understand what he is promising, for he divides the materials of an orator into the cause, and the examination.  The cause he defines to be a thing which has in itself a controversy of language united with the interposition of certain characters.  And that part, we too say, is assigned to the orator, for we give him those three parts which we have already mentioned,—­the judicial, the deliberative, and the demonstrative.  But the examination he defines to be that thing which has in itself a controversy of language, without the interposition of any particular characters, in this way—­“Whether there is anything good besides honesty?”—­“Whether the senses may be trusted?”—­“What is the shape of the world?”—­“What is the size of the sun?” But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such questions are far removed from the business of an orator, for it appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable matters, to a rhetorician or an orator.

But if Hermagoras himself had had any great acquaintance with these subjects, acquired with long study and training, then it would be supposed that he, from relying on his own knowledge, had laid down some false principles respecting the duty of an orator, and had explained not what his art could effect, but what he himself could do.  But as it is, the character of the man is such, that any one would be much more inclined to deny him any knowledge of rhetoric, than to grant him any acquaintance with philosophy.  Nor do I say this because the book on the art which he published appears to me to have been written with any particular incorrectness, (for, indeed, he appears to me to have shown very tolerable ingenuity and diligence in arranging topics which he had collected from ancient writings on the subject, and also to have advanced some new theories himself,) but it is the least part of the business of an orator to speak concerning his art, which is what he has done:  his business is rather to speak from his art, which is what we all see that this Hermagoras was very little able to do.  And so that, indeed, appears to us to be the proper materials of rhetoric, which we have said appeared to be such to Aristotle.  VII.  And these are the divisions of it, as numerous writers