P.  “We have.”

S.  “But there are many facts as they are, whereof to be enamoured would be base, for they cannot return your love.  As, for instance, that one and one make two, or that a horse has four legs.  With respect to such facts, you would be, would you not, in the same position as a mistress towards her slave?”

P.  “Certainly.  It seems, then, better to assume the other alternative.”

S.  “It does.  But does it not follow, that when you were enamoured of this spirit, you did not possess it?”

P.  “I fear so, by the argument.”

S.  “And I fear, too, that we agreed that he only who possessed the spirit of truth saw facts as they are; for that was involved in our definition of the spirit of truth.”

P.  “But, Socrates, I knew, at least, that one and one made two, and that a horse had four legs.  I must then have seen some facts as they are.”

S.  “Doubtless, fair boy; but not all.”

P.  “I do not pretend to that.”

S.  “But if you had possessed the spirit of truth, you would have seen all facts whatsoever as they are.  For he who possesses a thing can surely employ it freely for all purposes which are not contrary to the nature of that thing; can he not?”

P.  “Of course he can.  But if I did not possess the spirit of truth, how could I see any truth whatsoever?”

S.  “Suppose, dear boy, that instead of your possessing it, it were possible for it to possess you; and possessing you, to show you as much of itself, or as little, as it might choose, and concerning such things only as it might choose:  would not that explain the dilemma?”

P.  “It would assuredly.”

S.  “Let us see, then, whether this spirit of truth may not be something which is capable of possessing you, and employing you, rather than of being possessed and employed by you.  To me, indeed, this spirit seems likely to be some demon or deity, and that one of the greatest.”

P.  “Why then?”

S.  “Can lifeless and material things see?”

P.  “Certainly not; only live ones.”

S.  “This spirit, then, seems to be living; for it sees things as they are.”

P.  “Yes.”

S.  “And it is also intellectual; for intellectual facts can be only seen by an intellectual being.”

P.  “True.”

S.  “And also moral; for moral facts can only be seen by a moral being.”

P.  “True also.”

S.  “But this spirit is evidently not a man; it remains therefore, that it must be some demon.”

P.  “But why one of the greatest?”

S.  “Tell me, Phaethon, is not God to be numbered among facts as they are?”

P.  “Assuredly; for he is before all others and more eternal and absolute than all.”

S.  “Then this spirit of truth must also be able to see God as he is.”

P.  “It is probable.”