It is therefore my duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bearings.  The course of events is so rapidly hastening forward that the emergency may soon arise when you may be called upon to decide the momentous question whether you possess the power by force of arms to compel a State to remain in the Union.  I should feel myself recreant to my duty were I not to express an opinion on this important subject.

The question fairly stated is, Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy?  If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and to make war against a State.  After much serious reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the Federal Government.  It is manifest upon an inspection of the Constitution that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress, and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not “necessary and proper for carrying into execution” any one of these powers.  So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Constitution.  It appears from the proceedings of that body that on the 31st May, 1787, the clause “authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent State” came up for consideration.  Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract but a single sentence.  He observed: 

The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound.

Upon his motion the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I believe, again presented.  Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when incidentally adverting to the subject, he said:  “Any government for the United States formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress,” evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old Confederation.

Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution.  Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State; how are we to govern it afterwards?  Shall we hold it as a province and govern it by despotic power?  In the nature of things, we could not by physical force control the will of the people and compel them to elect Senators and Representatives to Congress and to perform all the other duties depending upon their own volition and required from the free citizens of a free State as a constituent member of the Confederacy.