of censure against him?  The very same rule might be applied for the very same reason to every judge of every court of the United States.  From what part of the Constitution is this terrible secret inquisitorial power derived?  No such express power exists.  From which of the enumerated powers can it be inferred?  It is true the House can not pronounce the formal judgment against him of “removal from office,” but they can by their judgment of censure asperse his reputation, and thus to the extent of their influence render the office contemptible.  An example is at hand of the reckless manner in which this power of censure can be employed in high party times.  The House on a recent occasion have attempted to degrade the President by adopting the resolution of Mr. John Sherman declaring that he, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Navy, “by receiving and considering the party relations of bidders for contracts and the effect of awarding contracts upon pending elections, have set an example dangerous to the public safety and deserving the reproof of this House.”

It will scarcely be credited that the sole pretext for this vote of censure was the simple fact that in disposing of the numerous letters of every imaginable character which I daily receive I had in the usual course of business referred a letter from Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, in relation to a contract, to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy, the head of the appropriate Department, without expressing or intimating any opinion whatever on the subject; and to make the matter if possible still plainer, the Secretary had informed the committee that “the President did not in any manner interfere in this case, nor has he in any other case of contract since I have been in the Department.”  The absence of all proof to sustain this attempt to degrade the President, whilst it manifests the venom of the shaft aimed at him, has destroyed the vigor of the bow.

To return after this digression:  Should the House, by the institution of Covode committees, votes of censure, and other devices to harass the President, reduce him to subservience to their will and render him their creature, then the well-balanced Government which our fathers framed will be annihilated.  This conflict has already been commenced in earnest by the House against the Executive.  A bad precedent rarely, if ever, dies.  It will, I fear, be pursued in the time of my successors, no matter what may be their political character.  Should secret committees be appointed with unlimited authority to range over all the words and actions, and, if possible, the very thoughts, of the President with a view to discover something in his past life prejudicial to his character from parasites and informers, this would be an ordeal which scarcely any mere man since the fall could endure.  It would be to subject him to a reign of terror from which the stoutest and purest heart might shrink.  I have passed triumphantly through this ordeal.