The chief objection urged against the grant of this authority is that Congress by conferring it would violate the Constitution; that it would be a transfer of the war-making, or, strictly speaking, the war-declaring, power to the Executive.  If this were well founded, it would, of course, be conclusive.  A very brief examination, however, will place this objection at rest.

Congress possess the sole and exclusive power under the Constitution “to declare war.”  They alone can “raise and support armies” and “provide and maintain a navy.”  But after Congress shall have declared war and provided the force necessary to carry it on the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, can alone employ this force in making war against the enemy.  This is the plain language, and history proves that it was the well-known intention of the framers, of the Constitution.

It will not be denied that the general “power to declare war” is without limitation and embraces within itself not only what writers on the law of nations term a public or perfect war, but also an imperfect war, and, in short, every species of hostility, however confined or limited.  Without the authority of Congress the President can not fire a hostile gun in any case except to repel the attacks of an enemy.  It will not be doubted that under this power Congress could, if they thought proper, authorize the President to employ the force at his command to seize a vessel belonging to an American citizen which had been illegally and unjustly captured in a foreign port and restore it to its owner.  But can Congress only act after the fact, after the mischief has been done?  Have they no power to confer upon the President the authority in advance to furnish instant redress should such a case afterwards occur?  Must they wait until the mischief has been done, and can they apply the remedy only when it is too late?  To confer this authority to meet future cases under circumstances strictly specified is as clearly within the war-declaring power as such an authority conferred upon the President by act of Congress after the deed had been done.  In the progress of a great nation many exigencies must arise imperatively requiring that Congress should authorize the President to act promptly on certain conditions which may or may not afterwards arise.  Our history has already presented a number of such cases.  I shall refer only to the latest.

Under the resolution of June 2, 1858, “for the adjustment of difficulties with the Republic of Paraguay,” the President is “authorized to adopt such measures and use such force as in his judgment may be necessary and advisable in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by the Government of Paraguay.”  “Just satisfaction” for what?  For “the attack on the United States steamer Water Witch” and “other matters referred to in the annual message of the President.”  Here the power is expressly granted upon the condition that the Government of Paraguay shall refuse to render this “just satisfaction.”  In this and other similar cases Congress have conferred upon the President power in advance to employ the Army and Navy upon the happening of contingent future events; and this most certainly is embraced within the power to declare war.