With respect to the memorandum of the noble duke, which has been so much the subject of cavil, it is the offspring of a manly mind, pouring out its honest opinions with an earnestness characteristic of sincerity, and with a zeal too warm to stand upon nice and scrupulous expression.  I am sure that it contains nothing but what the noble duke really thought.  I am sure that what he thought at the time of writing it, he would still maintain; and what he thinks and maintains regarding Spain, must, I should imagine, be received with respect and confidence by all who do not believe themselves to be better qualified to judge of Spain than he is.  Whatever may be thought of the Duke of Wellington’s suggestions here, confident I am that there is not an individual in Spain, to whom this paper was communicated, who took it as an offence, or who did not do full justice to the motives of the adviser, whatever they might think of the immediate practicability of his advice.  Would to God that some part of it, at least, had been accepted!  I admit the point of honour, I respect those who have acted upon it, I do not blame the Spaniards that they refused to make any sacrifice to temporary necessity; but still—­still I lament the result of that refusal.  Of this I am quite sure, that even if the Spaniards were justified in objecting to concede, it would have been a most romantic point of honour which should have induced Great Britain to abstain from recommending concession.

It is said that everything was required of Spain. and nothing of France.  I utterly deny it.  I have already described the relative situation of the two countries.  I will repeat, though the term has been so much criticized, that they had no external point of difference.  France said to Spain, ‘Your revolution disquiets me:’  and Spain replied to France, ’Your army of observation disquiets me.’  There were but two remedies to this state of things—­war or concession:  and why was England fastidiously, and (as I think) most mistakenly, to say, ’Our notions of non-interference are so strict that we cannot advise you even for your safety:  though whatever concession you may make may probably be met by corresponding concession on the part of France’?  Undoubtedly the withdrawing of the army of observation would have been, if not purely, yet in a great degree, an internal measure on the part of France; and one which, though I will not assert it to be precisely equivalent with the alteration by Spain of any fault in her Constitution; yet, considering its immediate practical advantage to Spain, would not, I think, have been too dearly purchased by such an alteration.  That France was called upon to make the corresponding concession, appears as well from the memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, as from the dispatches of Sir Charles Stuart, and from mine; and this concession was admitted by M. San Miguel to be the object which Spain most desired.  England saw that war must be the inevitable consequence of the existing state of things between the two kingdoms; and, if something were yielded on the one side, it would undoubtedly have been for England to insist upon a countervailing sacrifice on the other.