I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time.  I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion.  That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—­and I think very reasonably—­’If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.’  There was force in that.  I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in prospect.  I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet.  It could not be summoned.  An answer had to be given.  I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer.  That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose.  The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—­I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—­but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—­another Morocco crisis—­and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906.  But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply.  The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government: