connected with a military power and with that force which it is necessary to possess often in great transactions, though you may not fortunately feel that it is necessary to have recourse to that force.  Our object in entering into that arrangement with Turkey was, as I said before, to produce tranquillity and order.  When tranquillity and order were produced, we believed that the time would come when the energy and enterprise of Europe might be invited to what really is another Continent, as far as the experience of man is concerned, and that its development will add greatly not merely to the wealth and the prosperity of the inhabitants, but to the wealth and prosperity of Europe.  My Lords, I am surprised to hear—­for though I have not heard it myself from any authority, it is so generally in men’s mouths that I am bound to notice it—­that the step we have taken should be represented as one that is calculated to excite the suspicion or enmity of any of our Allies, or of any State.  My Lords, I am convinced that when a little time has elapsed, and when people are better acquainted with this subject than they are at present, no one will accuse England of having acted in this matter but with frankness and consideration for other Powers.  And if there be a Power in existence to which we have endeavoured to show most consideration from particular circumstances in this matter it is France.  There is no step of this kind that I would take without considering the effect it might have upon the feelings of France—­a nation to whom we are bound by almost every tie that can unite a people, and with whom our intimacy is daily increasing.  If there could be any step which of all others was least calculated to excite the suspicion of France it would appear to be this—­because we avoided Egypt, knowing how susceptible France is with regard to Egypt; we avoided Syria, knowing how susceptible France is on the subject of Syria; and we avoided availing ourselves of any part of the terra firma, because we would not hurt the feelings or excite the suspicions of France.  France knows that for the last two or three years we have listened to no appeal which involved anything like an acquisition of territory, because the territory which might have come to us would have been territory which France would see in our hands with suspicion and dislike.  But I must make this observation to your Lordships.  We have a substantial interest in the East; it is a commanding interest, and its behest must be obeyed.  But the interest of France in Egypt, and her interest in Syria are, as she acknowledges, sentimental and traditionary interests; and, although I respect them, I wish to see in the Lebanon and in Egypt the influence of France fairly and justly maintained, and although her officers and ours in that part of the world—­and especially in Egypt—­are acting together with confidence and trust, we must remember that our connexion with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment and tradition, but that we have urgent and