One word with respect to the Conference.  I never was of opinion that the Conference would arrive at any advantageous result.  I could not persuade myself, after reading the papers, that, whatever might be the cause, any one seriously wished for a settlement, except, of course, Her Majesty’s Ministers, and they had a reason for it.  The Conference lasted six weeks.  It wasted six weeks.  It lasted as long as a carnival, and, like a carnival, it was an affair of masks and mystification.  Our Ministers went to it as men in distressed circumstances go to a place of amusement—­to while away the time, with a consciousness of impending failure.  However, the summary of the Conference is this, that Her Majesty’s Government made two considerable proposals.  They proposed, first, the dismemberment of Denmark.  So much for its integrity.  They proposed, in the second place, that the remainder of Denmark should be placed under the joint guarantee of the Great Powers.  They would have created another Turkey in Europe, in the same geographical relation, the scene of the same rival intrigues, and the same fertile source of constant misconceptions and wars.  So much for the independence of Denmark.  These two propositions having been made, the one disastrous to the integrity and the other to the independence of Denmark, the Conference, even with these sacrifices offered, was a barren failure.

And I now wish to ask—­after having, I hope, with some clearness and in a manner tolerably comprehensive, placed the case before honourable members—­what is their opinion of the management of these affairs by Her Majesty’s Government?  I showed you that the beginning of this interference was a treaty by which England entered into obligations as regards Denmark not different from those of France.  I have shown you, on the evidence of the Secretary of State, that the present position of France with respect to Denmark is one quite magnanimous, free from all difficulties and disgrace.  I have shown you, I think, what every man indeed feels, that the position of England under this treaty, on the contrary, is most embarrassing, surrounded with difficulties, and full of humiliation.  I have stated my opinion that the difference between the position of England and that of France arose from the mis-management of our affairs.  That appeared to me to be the natural inference and logical deduction.  I have given you a narrative of the manner in which our affairs have been conducted, and now I ask you what is your opinion?  Do you see in the management of those affairs that capacity, and especially that kind of capacity that is adequate to the occasion?  Do you find in it that sagacity, prudence, that dexterity, that quickness of perception, and those conciliatory moods which we are always taught to believe necessary in the transaction of our foreign affairs?  Is there to be seen that knowledge of human nature, and especially that peculiar kind of science, most necessary in these affairs—­an acquaintance with the character of foreign countries and of the chief actors in the scene?