Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.

Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.

As to the four Powers impressing upon the Diet the heavy responsibility that it would incur if, by any precipitate measures, it were to break the peace of Europe before the Conference which had been proposed by the British Government for considering the means of settling the question between Germany and Denmark, and thereby maintaining that peace, can be assembled, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he had not forgotten that when Russia had been warned by France, Great Britain, and Austria of the responsibility which she was incurring by her conduct towards Poland, Prince Gortsehakoff had replied, ’that Russia was ready to assume that responsibility before God and man.’  He, for one, did not wish to provoke another answer of the same sort to be received with the same indifference. (No. 4, 536.)

The drama now becomes deeply interesting.  The events are quick.  That is the answer of the French Government; and on the next day Lord Russell writes to Lord Cowley to propose concert and co-operation with France to maintain the treaty—­that is, to prevent the occupation of Schleswig.  Lord Cowley writes the next day to Lord Russell that the French Government want to know what ‘concert and co-operation’ mean.  Lord Russell at last, on January 24, writes to say that concert and co-operation mean ‘if necessary, material assistance to Denmark’.  That must have been about the same time when the Cabinet was sitting to draw up Her Majesty’s speech, assuring Parliament that negotiations continued to be carried on in the interest of peace.  Now, Sir, what was the answer of the French Government when, at last, England invited her to go to war to settle the question between Germany and Denmark?  I will read the reply: 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after recapitulating the substance of my dispatch of January 24 to your Excellency, explains very clearly the views of the French Government upon the subject.  The Emperor recognizes the value of the London treaty as tending to preserve the balance of power and maintain the peace of Europe.  But the Government of France, while paying a just tribute to the purport and objects of the treaty of 1852, is ready to admit that circumstances may require its modification.  The Emperor has always been disposed to pay great regard to the feelings and aspirations of nationalities.  It is not to be denied that the national feelings and aspirations of Germany tend to a closer connexion with the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig.  The Emperor would feel repugnance to any course which should bind him to oppose in arms the wishes of Germany.  It may be comparatively easy for England to carry on a war which can never go beyond the maritime operations of blockade and capture of ships.  Schleswig and England are far apart from each other.  But the soil of Germany touches the soil of France, and a war between France and Germany would be one of the most burdensome and one of the most hazardous which the French Empire could engage.  Besides these considerations, the Emperor

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.