immediately to be stopped.  However elevated his position might be, even if it were M. Bismarck himself, he was to be pulled up directly, in the full flow of his eloquence; note was to be taken of this great diplomatic lapsus, and the Minister was to telegraph instantly home to his Government how he had carried out his instructions in this respect.  On December 17, the noble lord wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan, our ambassador at Berlin: 

Let it suffice at present for Her Majesty’s Government to declare that they would consider any departure from the treaty of succession of 1852, by Powers who signed or acceded to that treaty, as entirely inconsistent with good faith. (No. 3, 383.)

Similar dispatches were sent to Wurtemberg, Hanover, and Saxony.  On December 23 the noble earl wrote to Sir Andrew Buchanan: 

  If the overthrow of the dynasty now reigning in Denmark
  is sought by Germany, the most serious consequences
  may ensue. (No. 3, 411.)

I want to know what honourable members mean by cheering the words I have just quoted.  If you wish to convey even to a little Power that if it does a certain thing you will go to war with it, you take care not to announce your intention in an offensive manner; because, were you to do so, probably, even the smallest Power in Europe would not yield.  And certainly if you wish to tell a great Power in Europe what may be eventually the consequences if it should adopt a different line from that which you desire, you would not abruptly declare that if it declined to accede to your wish you would declare war.  Why, there are no dispatches on record in the world—­there is no record in any Foreign Office of language of this kind.  The question is, what interpretation can be put on these threats.  The Secretary of State writes again on December 25 to Sir Andrew Buchanan, stating that: 

Any precipitate action on the part of the German Confederation may lead to consequences fatal to the peace of Europe, and may involve Germany, in particular, in difficulties of the most serious nature. (No. 4, 414.)

On December 26 the Secretary of State writes to Sir Alexander Malet, and sends him a copy of the treaty of 1852, in order that he might communicate it to the Diet.  Now, that is the state of affairs after the King of Denmark’s death; after he had been perfectly acquainted with the policy of France; after he had been frankly told that the French Emperor had explicitly informed Denmark that if she got involved in war with Germany, France would not come to her assistance.  Now the words ‘if she went to war’ might have been interpreted in two ways; because she might get into war without any fault of her own, and Germany might be the aggressor:  but there could be no mistake in regard to the words ‘if she became involved in war’.  Neither Denmark nor England could make any mistake in regard to the policy of France, which the Secretary of State now says was a magnanimous policy.