yet, I say, if Her Majesty’s Government were of opinion that the balance of power were endangered by a quarrel between Germany and Denmark, they were justified in giving their advice to Denmark, in threatening Germany, and in taking the general management of the affairs of Denmark; but they were bound, if a war did take place between Germany and Denmark, to support Denmark.  Instead of that, they invented a process of conduct which I hope is not easily exampled in the history of this country, and which I can only describe in one sentence—­it consisted of menaces never accomplished and promises never fulfilled.

With all these difficulties they never hesitate in their tone.  At least, let us do them this justice—­there never were, in semblance, more determined Ministers.  They seemed at least to rejoice in the phantom of a proud courage.  But what do they do?  They send a special envoy to Denmark, who was to enforce their policy and arrange everything.  Formally the special envoy was sent to congratulate the King on his accession to the throne of Denmark, and all the other Powers did the same; but in reality the mission of Lord Wodehouse was for greater objects than that, and his instructions are before us in full.  Without wearying the House by reading the whole of those instructions, I will read one paragraph, which is the last, and which is, as it were, a summary of the whole.  They were written at the end of December.  Recollect, this is the policy of the Government after refusing the Congress, and after the death of the King of Denmark, which had therefore incurred a still deeper responsibility, and which, we must suppose, had deeply considered all the issues involved.  This is the cream of the instructions given by the Government to Lord Wodehouse: 

  The result to be arrived at is the fulfilment of the treaty
  of May 8, 1852, and of the engagements entered into by
  Prussia and Austria and Denmark in 1851-2. (No. 3, 353.)

Lord Wodehouse could not possibly be at fault as to what he was to do when he arrived at his destination.  His was, no doubt, a significant appointment.  He was a statesman of some experience; he had held a subordinate but important position in the administration of our foreign affairs; he had been a Minister at a northern Court; he had recently distinguished himself in Parliament by a speech on the question of Germany and Denmark, in which he took a decidedly dangerous view.  Lord Wodehouse received clear instructions as to what he was to do.  But, at the same time, what was the conduct of the Secretary of State?  While Lord Wodehouse was repairing to his post, did the Secretary of State in the least falter in his tone?  It was about this time that the great diplomatic reprimand was sent to Sir Alexander Malet for having talked of the ‘protocol’ of 1852 instead of the ‘treaty’.  This was the time that instructions were sent out that if anybody had the hardihood to mention the ‘protocol’ of 1852 he was