that, I deem it too absurd a supposition; but suppose that force had required to be used, that force would not have given to Russia, or to any other Power, a claim to territorial extension.  We chose to cast upon her the responsibility; and she, making great exertions and great sacrifices of blood and treasure, advanced this claim to territory, the consequence of which is that she has received by that a great access of military reputation, and likewise an enlargement of her borders, which we have been the main agents in bringing about.

Now I think I anticipate your feelings when I say that although we, and all of us, say that the rights of a Power, the rights of a nation, ought not to be invaded because it happens to have the misfortune of a despotic Government, yet none of us would wish that the agency of England should be gratuitously and wantonly employed in extending the limits of that despotism, and causing it to exercise its power where that power had not before prevailed.  In truth, as you know, the case is even more gross than I have supposed it, because the most important case of this extension was that in which a portion of Bessarabia was handed back to Russia.  That portion of Bessarabia had been under free institutions—­perfectly free representative institutions.  It was handed back to Russia, and placed under despotic institutions, and it was so handed back under an arrangement made between Lord Salisbury, the Minister of England, and Count Schouvaloff, the Minister of Russia.  They agreed beforehand that this should be done at the Congress at Berlin, with this reservation—­Lord Salisbury said, ‘Unless I convince you by my argument that you ought not to do it.’  You may attach what value you please to the reservation, but I think I can illustrate without much difficulty the effect of that promise made beforehand.  You remember, perhaps, that in the year 1871 the Russians demanded that the Treaty of Paris should be altered, and that the restriction should be removed upon their right to build ships in the Black Sea.  The whole of the Powers of Europe met in London by their representatives, and they agreed to that change, and the charge, gentlemen, has been laid upon the British Government of having made that change; and not only so, but I read in one of the blue placards this morning that Mr. Gladstone removed the restriction from the Emperor of Russia.  Now I repel that charge.  What we did was—­we considered the matter with the other Powers of Europe; we required Russia to admit that she had no power to make the change except with the consent of the other Powers.  The other Powers could not deny that the change was in itself not unreasonable, and so the change was made.  But I want to know what people would have said, supposing, in the middle of these deliberations, somebody had produced a Salisbury-Schouvaloff agreement.  Supposing he had produced a memorandum signed by Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary of England, and Count Brunow, the ambassador of Russia,