say, not unjust—that we allured her on
to her ruin; that we gave the Turks a right to believe
that we should support them; that our ambassadors,
Sir Henry Elliot and Sir Austin Layard, both of them
said we had most vital interests in maintaining Turkey
as it was, and consequently the Turks thought if we
had vital interests, we should certainly defend them;
and they were thereby lured on into that ruinous, cruel,
and destructive war with Russia. But by our conduct
to the Slavonic populations we alienated those populations
from us. We made our name odious among them.
They had every disposition to sympathize with us,
every disposition to confide in us. They are,
as a people, desirous of freedom, desirous of self-government,
with no aggressive views, but hating the idea of being
absorbed in a huge despotic empire like Russia.
But when they found that we, and the other Powers of
Europe under our unfortunate guidance, declined to
become in any manner their champions in defence of
the rights of life, of property, and of female honour—when
they found that there was no call which could find
its way to the heart of England through its Government,
or to the hearts of the other Powers, and that Russia
alone was disposed to fight for them, why, naturally
they said, Russia is our friend. We have done
everything, gentlemen, in our power to drive these
populations into the arms of Russia. If Russia
has aggressive dispositions in the direction of Turkey—and
I think it probable that she may have them—it
is we who have laid the ground upon which Russia may
make her march to the south—we who have
taught the Bulgarians, the Servians, the Roumanians,
the Montenegrins, that there is one Power in Europe,
and only one, which is ready to support in act and
by the sword her professions of sympathy with the
oppressed populations of Turkey. That power is
Russia; and how can you blame these people, if in such
circumstances, they are disposed to say, Russia is
our friend? But why did we make them say it?
Simply because of the policy of the Government, not
because of the wishes of the people of this country.
Gentlemen, this is the most dangerous form of aggrandizing
Russia. If Russia is aggressive anywhere, if
Russia is formidable anywhere, it is by movements
towards the south, it is by schemes for acquiring command
of the Straits or of Constantinople; and there is no
way by which you can possibly so much assist her in
giving reality to these designs, as by inducing and
disposing the populations of these provinces, who
are now in virtual possession of them, to look upon
Russia as their champion and their friend, to look
upon England as their disguised, perhaps, but yet
real and effective enemy.