Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.

Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.
is likewise well known, and whose long experience of European affairs makes him most desirous to preserve the peace of Europe, might perform these functions to the satisfaction of the Powers concerned.  But the question of who should be the arbitrator never arose, Austria and Prussia said that they could accept the good offices of a friendly Power in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, but that they could not accept the decision of that friendly Power as final; and in the meantime they asked for a long armistice.  Now, my Lords, it appeared to us that if that proposal were accepted, then, after a period of two or three months of armistice, during which the naval operations of Denmark would be suspended, a decision would have been announced which, if it in any way displeased the German Powers—­if it did not go to the full extent of all their demands—­would have been refused by them.  The Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation completely confirmed our view of this question by declaring that in his opinion this territory of Schleswig belonged altogether to the Prince of Augustenburg, or rather belonged to the competency of the German Confederation; that they could therefore accept no arbitration, and could not be bound by anything that was decided.  They evidently meant that every foot of territory in Schleswig might, if they chose it, be demanded at the end of the good offices by the German Confederation.  Thus, according to what I am sorry to say has been the usual manner of the German Powers, their refusal was not a direct and straightforward one.  It is somewhat like their declaration at the beginning, that they went into Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, that they went into Schleswig for the purpose of material occupation, and that they wished the question of the sovereignty of Holstein and Schleswig to be decided in the German Confederation, knowing perfectly well how that decision would be made; and then, lastly, they wished to have the appearance of accepting the good offices of an arbitrator without really intending to accept them.  The Danish Plenipotentiaries, most unfortunately in my opinion—­most imprudently in my opinion—­gave a decided refusal to the proposal.  Of course, it was for them to judge as to the security of their own country and the prospects of war; but I certainly regret deeply that they should have rejected the arbitration.  The proposal that I made certainly did not exactly agree with the line of the Schlei, but it was a proposal which we, the British Plenipotentiaries, thought was for the benefit of Denmark, and was most likely to obtain for the Danes a peace which would have been satisfactory to them.  And now, my Lords, all other means having failed, one other proposal was made on the part of France by the French Plenipotentiary, who was directed to make this proposal—­that, leaving the Danish part of Schleswig to the Danes, and the German part to the Germans, the line to be drawn in the disputed district should be decided by a vote of the population, to be taken in some fair manner, the details of which might be considered afterwards. [The Earl of Clarendon:  The votes were to be taken in each commune.] Yes, and these votes were to decide the line to be drawn and the district which was to belong to Germany and to Denmark respectively.

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Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.