points, to give a guarantee—­a European guarantee—­to Denmark, which would have left that Power, indeed, without any sovereignty over the German population, but still possessed of an independent territory, and still possessed of a free and happy Government, not subject to foreign interference.  Well, the question was, whether, there remaining only this line of frontier to be decided, it could not be arranged in some way to which both Powers would agree.  We thought it possible that in that case the spirit of the Protocol of Paris might be adopted.  The Protocol of Paris said, that when serious differences arose between any Powers, and there was danger of those differences being carried to hostilities, the good offices of a friendly Power might be resorted to, and it appeared to us that if this principle could be brought into action, the continuance of the war might be obviated.  It was stated at the same time by the French Plenipotentiary at Paris, and by others, that where the honour or the essential interests of a country were mainly concerned, it could not be expected that such differences should be submitted to a friendly Power.  But, in our opinion, this was not such a case.  It appeared to us that sooner than rush into war—­sooner, above all, than expose Denmark again to such an unequal contest—­it was possible to propose the good offices of a friendly Power, with this condition—­that both Powers should submit to the decision respecting the line of frontier offered by the arbitrator to whom the matter might be referred.  In fact it was to be an arbitration rather than good offices.  Now, I cannot but believe that any impartial arbitrator would have fixed upon a line far more favourable to Denmark than that which the German Powers had proposed.  A Power which was impartial and without passion would probably have given, not the line as far as the north of Flensburg, but a line to the south of Flensburg, whereby that important town might have been preserved to Denmark, and that Power would have had a port in the Northern Sea by which her independence might have been maintained.  It was, however, entirely a question for the two Powers to accept or to refuse that arbitration.  I may say further that my noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and myself, who were the British Plenipotentiaries at the Conference, thought that after the fairness and the impartiality which the Emperor of the French had shown throughout this question, his friendliness, and at the same time his wish for the maintenance of peace, the two Powers might well have accepted his good offices.  The opinion was, however, expressed by one of the Plenipotentiaries—­an opinion afterwards confirmed by an official declaration—­that no Power represented at the Conference, and therefore committed to a certain degree as to the questions before the Conference, could properly be accepted as the arbitrating Power.  It then appeared to us, and we so informed the Plenipotentiaries, that in our opinion the King of the Belgians, whose impartiality