and in reference to which my noble friend Lord Clarendon made a clear and pointed statement at a subsequent meeting of the Conference.  The Danish Government considered that the line which we had proposed in the name of the neutral Powers, and after consulting the neutral Powers, as a basis of pacification, was an English proposal—­an English proposal by which England was bound to abide, and which she was bound to maintain at all hazards.  Nothing of the kind, however, was ever stated by the British Plenipotentiaries; nothing of the kind had Denmark a right to expect.  I did inform the Danish Plenipotentiary, when there was a question of continuing the Armistice, that I should not propose nor support any division but the line of the Schlei without the consent of Denmark; but I never gave him to understand that England would support that line otherwise than by urging its adoption in conjunction with the other neutral Powers at the meetings of the Conference.  The last suspension of arms was only for a fortnight, and it remained for us to consider what should be done—­the two parties being obstinately bent on the maintenance of their different rights—­the Germans insisting on the line from Apenrade to Tondern, and the Danes insisting first upon a line extending more to the south than that which the British Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Conference, and afterwards agreeing to that line, but declaring that they would make no further concessions.  What could be done to bring about an amicable understanding?  In this situation of affairs, knowing that Denmark would not consent to any other line—­indeed, not knowing whether the German Powers would concede any other line—­the Prussian Plenipotentiary said that he was ready to recommend to his Government a line which should proceed from the north of Flensburg to Tondern, but that he was not authorized to propose that line in the name of his Government.  The Austrian Plenipotentiary did not accede at first, but afterwards said that he would recommend it to the consideration of his Government.  But the Danes at once refused it, and the proposal fell to the ground.  It then remained to be considered whether, without proposing any other line, some means could not be found by which peace might still be preserved.  We considered that question very anxiously, and it came to be a subject of reflection whether we could not, even at the last moment, propose something which might bring the two Powers to an agreement.  It was obvious that many and great difficulties had to be removed.  The King of Denmark was ready to yield a part of his dominions of which he had been deprived by war.  The German Plenipotentiaries were ready to say that a part of the Duchy of Schleswig should remain under the rule of the King of Denmark.  Both Powers were ready to accept the proposal that there should be no interference in future in the internal government of Denmark; and all the Powers, I think, would have been ready, if there had been an agreement on other