obvious that unless we had been prepared—­I should say all of us prepared—­to carry on a great war for the purpose, after the hostilities which had taken place, after the declarations which had been made by the German Powers, if anything like a personal union had been established there would at once have been a declaration on the part of the Duchies and on the part of the German Confederation, supported by Austria and Prussia, that the Prince of Augustenburg was entitled to hold the Duchies, and that he was the rightful Sovereign; and that if the Danish troops entered to dispute possession of the Duchies, they would be opposed by Austria, Prussia, and the whole Confederation.  We had therefore to consider what we could propose which would be most favourable to Denmark under the circumstances which I have stated to your Lordships.  Of course we could only propose something of a diplomatic nature, which we thought likely to be accepted.  We accordingly prepared a proposition, which I as President of the Conference was to submit, and which I was assured would be supported by the Plenipotentiaries of France and Sweden, and as far as possible by the Russian Plenipotentiary, though he had not then received definite instructions.  What we proposed was that the King of Denmark should yield to Germany the Duchy of Holstein and the Southern portion of the Duchy of Schleswig—­that the boundary should be drawn as far as the Schlei, and should go along by the Dannewerke:  that there should be no menacing fortresses on the boundary; that the German Powers should not interfere any further or any more in the internal affairs of Denmark; and that a general guarantee should be given by the European Powers for the rest of the Danish possessions.  With regard to this proposal, the Danish Plenipotentiaries made a declaration which I think did that Government the highest honour.  They declared that the King of Denmark had accepted the Crown of that country according to the Treaty of 1852, thinking that his doing so would tend to the peace of Europe and to preserve the balance of power; but, as the surrender of a great part of his territory was now demanded, he was ready to make that concession, provided that entire independence and self-government were left to the remainder of his dominions.  The King of Denmark declared he was ready to accept the line of the Schlei as proposed:  and without defining it he declared it was necessary there should be a military and commercial line drawn for the sake of the independence of Denmark; and he declared moreover that there should be an European guarantee for the possession of the remainder of his territory.  The German Governments, while they accepted the proposal for the partition of Schleswig—­while they no longer demanded the whole of that Duchy—­declared that, according to their views, the line of demarcation must go much further north.  They said that the line must be from Apenrade to Tondern; and that they could not assent to the line proposed on the part