up to the present hour, and, if common fame can be
trusted, there is less chance now of that negotiation
leading to the pacification of Northern Italy than
there was three or four months ago. I deeply
lament this, my Lords. Every friend of the true
policy of England, and every friend of the peace of
Europe, must lament it. I hear it said, our Foreign
Office lends its aid to the delay of peaceful measures
in Turin; and I hear it with wonder, considering what
has passed within the last two years. But I am
afraid that there are some natures far too sanguine—some
whom no failure can cure of the most extravagant hopes—who,
while they are sinking, cling to the feeblest straw,
and derive hope from the slightest change, and who,
because things are not just as they were twenty-four
hours before, expect that better times are coming,
and hope even against hope itself. I think that
what has recently taken place in Hungary, in Croatia,
and in Transylvania, has been the foundation of the
hopes recently entertained by the friends of Sardinia,
and that some parties in England, but still more in
Turin, have conceived expectations that Austria, if
these negotiations are allowed to drag their slow
length along, will be frustrated in her designs of—what?
Aggrandizement? Oh, no. If that were all,
the difficulty might easily be removed. For look,
my Lords, how the matter stands. Here is craving
ambition on the one side, against a steady adherence
to a pacific policy on the other; here is a desire
to enlarge dominion against the solemn faith of treaties
on the one part, and a resolution not to swerve a
hair’s breadth from that faith on the other,
even when tempted by aggression the most unjust, and
crowned by success the most absolute and complete.
Here is good faith unsurpassed, almost unexampled
moderation in victory, met by incurable thirst of
aggrandizement, and reckless love of change under the
most grievous disaster.
Thus stand the rival powers of Sardinia and Austria
opposed to each other. I hope that I view these
matters more gloomily than the real state of things
warrants; but I certainly feel not a little uneasy
when I reflect on the great length to which these negotiations
have been sedulously spun out. And here, my Lords,
I must observe, that this brings me, among many of
the views which I now, anticipating somewhat, have
taken of the present state of the Powers, to the conviction
that the various matters now in dispute can only be
settled by some general congress. This would at
once close the Turin Conference. I have before
mentioned to your Lordships that the favour which
the Government of England has shown to Sardinia, and
the prejudice against Austria, has exhibited itself—indeed,
I may say, has broken out very conspicuously, in two
portions of these transactions. First, it was
displayed in the general difference of the language
used to Austria and to Sardinia. To Austria we
have held out everything short of threat—we
have addressed her in language gentle indeed in outward