Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.

Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 549 pages of information about Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914.
to it as far as I can, under his correction.  The fact of which he was probably thinking was this:  In 1814, when the issue of the war between Napoleon and the other Powers of Europe was doubtful, a treaty, of which part has been made public, was signed at Reichenbach between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, for the entire partition of Poland between them, in the event of their success against France.  The effect of this treaty would have been to extinguish the name of Poland as a separate and independent element of European geography.  In 1813, after Napoleon had been repulsed from Russia, and the war had retired to the westward of Germany and of Europe, where shortly after it was brought to a close, discussions took place at Vienna as to what should be done with Poland.  Austria called for the execution of the compact, and, with England, demanded that either the Treaty of Reichenbach should be completely carried out, and Poland divided equally into three parts for each of the contracting parties, or that she should be reconstructed and made anew into a substantive state between the three Powers.  Russia was of a different opinion, and contended not for the execution of the Treaty of Reichenbach, but for the arrangement which was subsequently carried into effect, namely, that the greater part of Poland was to be made into a kingdom and annexed to her Crown, and that the remaining parts should be divided between the two other states.  After a great deal of discussion the Treaty of Reichenbach was set aside, and the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna were made.  I suppose this is what led the hon. member to his statement that Austria would join with us, because in 1814 she was favourable to the re-establishment of Poland as a separate kingdom, as one alternative in contradiction to her partition; for any other ground than this I cannot conceive for his assertion.  If Austria were favourable to the Polish insurrection subsequently, I can only say that it is a fact as unknown to me as was the existence of the four days of danger, and I am inclined to place both assertions on the same foundation.  The interest of Austria was in fact quite different; and it was owing to her feeling respecting Poland, that the Russians ultimately succeeded in crushing the insurrection.  But then, says the hon. and learned member, you should have accepted the offers of France.  I have often argued the question before, and what, I said before I say again.  If France had gone to the extent, of proposing to England to join, with her against Russia, this would have been nothing more nor less than the offer of a war in Europe, which, as our great object was to keep down such a war, we should never have thought of accepting.  It would have been a war without the chance of anything but a war, for let us look to the position of the kingdom of Poland—­let us consider that it was surrounded by Austria, by Russia, and by Prussia, that there was a large Russian army actually in Poland, and that there was a Prussian
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Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.