LONDON, February 10, 1863

You ask me about Kinglake’s book—­everybody except ourselves is reading or has read it....  With regard to the sleepy Cabinet dinner at Pembroke Lodge he has from what we hear fallen into great inaccuracy....  John says that the despatch, having been circulated in the Cabinet before that dinner, was already well known to them all.  As far as he remembers none but Sir William Molesworth went to sleep.  I remember perfectly how several of them told me afterwards about Sir William sleeping and falling from his chair, and we have often laughed about it, but I do not remember being told of anybody else going to sleep.  I suppose I shall read the book, but I cannot tell you how I shrink from anything that must recall and make one live over again those terrible months of vacillation and weakness, the consequence of a Coalition Cabinet, which “drifted” us into a most terrible war—­a war from which consistency and firmness would have saved us.  A thoroughly Aberdeen Ministry would have maintained peace.  A thoroughly Russell or Palmerston Ministry would have maintained peace and honour too.

    Lord Russell to Lady Minto

    PEMBROKE LODGE, July 9, 1863

Parliament is coming to an end, most people being tired of talking and everybody of listening....  Lord Chelmsford says in honour of the House of Lords:  “The Commons have a great deal to do and they don’t do it—­the Lords have nothing to do and they do it.”

In 1863 relations between England and America were again strained.  English vessels were perpetually running the blockade to bring cotton to England and goods to the Southern ports—­a risky but highly profitable business.  They were often captured by Northern cruisers and forfeited.  There were complaints on our side that the Federal courts were not always careful to distinguish in their decisions between cases of deliberate blockade-running and legitimate trading with ports beyond the Southern frontier.  The North, besides blockade-running, had a further cause of complaint.  The Confederates were getting cruisers built for them in neutral ports.  The most famous case of the kind was that of the Alabama, which was built in the Mersey.  The English Government had information of its destination, but failed to prevent it sailing—­a failure which eventually cost us an indemnity of L3,000,000.  The speech referred to in the following letter was made in the midst of these troubles.  It was a defence of England’s good faith in the matter of the Alabama and an assertion that Americans should be left to settle their own difficulties without European mediation.  At this time the French Government and a strong party in England were in favour of European intervention.  By securing the independence of the South, they hoped to diminish the power of the United States in the future.  Such an idea could only be entertained while the struggle between North and South seemed evenly balanced.  The next year showed the hopelessness of such a project and vindicated the wisdom of the English Government in having refused to attempt to divide America into two independent Powers.