Subsequently it came to light that Napoleon’s surprising readiness in agreeing to the annexation of Central Italy in April had been due to a private arrangement between him and Cavour in the previous month.  It was agreed between them in March that Savoy and Nice should be handed over to France as the price of her acquiescence.  In the secret treaty of Plombieres, Napoleon’s reward for helping the Piedmontese, should the war leave Venice, Lombardy, and the Romagna in Victor Emmanuel’s hands, had been fixed as the cession of these territories to France.  But since Napoleon had withdrawn and made peace when, as yet, only Lombardy had been wrested from Austria, he had waived his claim upon Nice and Savoy at Villafranca, and claimed in exchange a contribution towards his expenses in the war.  But the moment Piedmont proposed to annex Tuscany, the Romagna and the Duchies, he returned to his original claim.  His action had two important results:  one which immediately added to the complication of Italian politics, and one which affected the diplomatic relations of the Great Powers for the next eleven years.  In Italy his demand made a lasting breach between Cavour and Garibaldi.  The latter never forgave the cession of Nice, his native town, to France, and never could be convinced that the sacrifice of Italian territory was a necessary step towards uniting Italy.  In his eyes the agreement with Napoleon had been a kind of treason on the part of Cavour.  Among the European Powers, on the other hand, Napoleon’s action created an impression, which was never effaced, that he was a predatory and treacherous power.

In England the news was received with the greatest indignation.  Lord John was extremely angry, and practically threatened war.  He, like Garibaldi, did not realize that Cavour was driven to the concession, nor that Napoleon was, in truth, compelled on his side to demand what he did.  The following letter from Sir James Hudson, the English Minister at Turin—­“uomo italianissimo,” as Cavour called him—­is particularly interesting, because, though addressed to Lady John, it reads as though it were also intended for the eyes of the Foreign Secretary, from whom indignation had temporarily concealed the truth that this sacrifice was the only compensation which would have induced Napoleon to look on quietly while the new kingdom of Italy was consolidating on his frontier.  The last event Cavour desired was a war between the two Powers whose unanimity forced neutrality upon Austria.  Napoleon on his side was practically obliged to demand Savoy and Nice as a barrier against Italy, and because the acquisition of territory alone could have prevented his subjects from feeling that they had lost their lives and money only to further the aims of Victor Emmanuel.

    Sir James Hudson to Lady John Russell

    TURIN, April 6, 1860