Lombardy was to be surrendered to France and then handed over to Italy; the Italian States were to be formed into a Federation under the honorary presidency of the Pope (this was intended to soothe French Catholics); Venetia, while remaining under Austrian rule, was to be a member of the Federation, and the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to resume their thrones.  Napoleon wished to add a further stipulation that neither side should use their armies to secure this latter object, but over this there rose so much haggling that the outcome was only an understanding between the two Emperors (not committed to paper) that Austria would not oppose the establishment of constitutional government in those States, should they themselves desire it, but at the same time she retained by her silence her right to interfere for other reasons; while France on her side asserted that she would neither restore the Dukes by force of arms herself nor—­and here lay a point of great importance—­allow Austria to interfere should she act upon the right she had reserved.

As may be imagined, to men who had set their hearts on a free united Italy, such a treaty was exasperating.  However aware Victor Emmanuel might be that he owed much to France, he could not but be bitterly disappointed by Napoleon withdrawing his help when the struggle had just begun and when the freedom of Lombardy alone had been won.  Cavour resigned in a passion of resentment that Victor Emmanuel should have countenanced such a peace.  “Siamo traditi” was the cry at Milan and Turin.  Yet Napoleon had already done much for the union of Italy; in fact, he had done more than he knew, and far more than he ever intended.  Though no one at first fully realized it, the stipulation that Austria should not attempt to use force to restore the fugitive Dukes, and that France should abstain from similar interference, really opened a path for the union of Italy.  This was the first important juncture at which Lord John brought valuable assistance to the cause of “Italy for the Italians,” since he kept Napoleon to his promise, after he had good reasons to regret it, and bent the whole weight of England’s influence towards persuading reluctant Austria to accept on her side the principle of complete non-intervention.

It must be remembered that the terms of Villafranca, in so far as the question of armed intervention was concerned, had never been finally ratified; and it was Napoleon’s wish that the European Powers should form a Congress at Zuerich, at which the Convention would acquire the stability of a European treaty, and the nature of the proposed Italian Federation be finally defined.  Lord John and Palmerston, while protesting against the clause of the treaty which, by including Venice in the Federation, still left Austria a preponderating influence in Italian affairs, refused to take part in this Congress unless Napoleon promised beforehand to withdraw his army from Italy as soon as possible, and to join England in insisting that no Austrian troops should be allowed in future to cross the borders of their own Venetian territory.