miles in the middle of the night in fifteen minutes; but I had lived long enough in the East to know that the Oriental never sets a European impossible tasks without a good reason from his own point of view.  I dispatched orderlies to each detachment with definite instructions to be ready to move at once.  The Japanese refused to move or even get out of their tents.  The Czechs were enjoying a much-needed rest, and refused to budge, while Kalmakoff’s Cossacks remained asleep beside their horses.  Ataman Kalmakoff was at Vladivostok, and his second in command was dismissed on his return for refusing to obey my orders, as the Ataman was most anxious that his men should be always in the fighting line wherever it might be.  Captain Clark, M.C., reported the 25th Middlesex as ready to march, transport and all complete, twenty-five minutes after receiving the order.

To make doubly sure there was no mistake, I called personally upon the Japanese officer, who point-blank refused either to arouse or move his men in accordance with his own Headquarters’ order.  I am bound to admit that from that moment I had a suspicion that the order of General Oie was so much Japanese camouflage, and that it was not intended that we should take any part in the immediate operations.  I also determined to frustrate this attempt to exclude the Allies from participation, and gave the order to my own men to move.

Our road for about two miles lay alongside the railway, after which the soddened nature of the ground and the danger of losing direction in the darkness forced me to take to the railway.  About a mile and a half along the track brought us to our armoured trains, where we were to pick up our Machine-Gun Section, which was to act with us if necessary, or remain as a reserve or rallying-point in case of need.  Except for the sentries, the train crews were asleep, and almost within rifle range of our place of assembly.  I halted my men and roused Captain Bath to inquire if he had received instructions as to his part in the coming battle.  He informed me that he had received a telephone message from General Oie (through Major Pichon) which he could not understand and had asked for it to be repeated.  He thereupon produced the message, which was to the effect that a battle would commence at 3 A.M., but that the British armoured trains and the British troops were not to be allowed to take any part in the impending engagement.  On the production of the actual message I began to understand why the order of battle had been given to me too late for me to be at the rendezvous with Colonel Inagaki, and the refusal of the units of my command to march with me.  These instructions to Captain Bath from the Japanese Headquarters explained the riddle.  I gave Captain Bath instructions to move forward in my support in case of need and to watch the proceedings generally, to render aid to any Allied detachment which might be in difficulties, and otherwise to obey General Oie’s orders.  This duty he performed with complete satisfaction to the commanders of the French and Czech detachments.