would never accept the abolition of absolutism as final.  The Russian people have it in their bones to obey a leader; their warlike nature precludes the possibility of their continued loyalty to a junta, however able.  A crown on top, with a parliament to control and direct, would be the happiest solution of Russia’s present difficulties.  He summed his theory up in these words:  “A properly elected parliament to make the law and rule, but there must be a monarch to issue its orders.”

Though this is the expressed opinion of what the Bolshevik would term one of the “old regime,” it is nevertheless the openly-expressed opinion of the sensible leaders of every class of Russian society except two—­the Bolsheviks at one end, and the Absolutists at the other.  More than once already these two extremes have come close together to frustrate the possibility of a compromise on constitutional lines.  They openly declare that, unless power is given to either one or the other, they would prefer that the present anarchy should continue.  It is not the first time in revolutionary history that the adherents of autocracy (Royalist and otherwise) have preferred the ruin of their country rather than lose their own personal power.

Ghondati is a clear-headed patriot, and I am surprised that his counsel has not been sought for in this supreme moment of his country’s history.  His ideas relating to recognition by the Powers were rather remarkable.  He did not think that any country could give help to Russia without either asking for conditions or being suspected of doing so.  The only exception was England.  The reason England is not suspected is that her Empire is so vast and varied in character that she has all the raw material for her trade and all the space she requires for her surplus population.  Her help, unlike that of any other State so far, has been unselfish and unconditional.  Ghondati quite saw that “this fact was producing a steady and permanent orientation of Russian opinion towards England, which, if cultivated by British statesmanship, would eventually give my country everything she required, while those whose help was always surrounded with conditions would have great difficulty to retain the advantages they secured only under the pressure of circumstances.”

CHAPTER XXII

AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS

At Nikolsk my train was stopped as the No. 4 Post train from Vladivostok had been wrecked by Bolsheviks, a startling situation considering that eleven months previously the whole power of Bolshevism had been destroyed in these maritime provinces.  The station commandant was an old friend, who had given me his own private official carriage at the time when our little yellow brother had decided to lower the prestige of his white Ally in Eastern eyes by making British officers travel in cattle-trucks.  He came into my car and began to explain how the cross-purposes