Hence it had no leisure to compose a fitting introduction to itself for students of philosophy.  William James’s Pragmatism, great as it is as a work of genius, brilliant as it is as a contribution to literature, was intended mainly for the man in the street.  It is so lacking in the familiar philosophic catchwords that it may be doubted whether any professor has quite understood it.  And moreover, it was written some years ago, and no longer covers the whole ground.  The other writings of the pragmatists have all been too controversial and technical.

The critics of Pragmatism have produced only caricatures so gross as to be unrecognizable, and so obscure as to be unintelligible.  Mr. Murray’s little book alone may claim to be (within its limits) a complete survey of the field, simply worded, and yet not unmindful of due technicality.  It is also up to date, though in dealing with so progressive a subject it is impossible to say how long it is destined to remain so.

F.C.S.  Schiller.

CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF PRAGMATISM

There is a curious impression to-day in the world of thought that Pragmatism is the most audacious of philosophic novelties, the most anarchical transvaluation of all respectable traditions.  Sometimes it is pictured as an insurgence of emotion against logic, sometimes as an assault of theology upon the integrity of Pure Reason.  One day it is described as the reckless theorizing of dilettanti whose knowledge of philosophy is too superficial to require refutation, the next as a transatlantic importation of the debasing slang of the Wild West.  Abroad it is frequently denounced as an outbreak of the sordid commercialism of the Anglo-Saxon mind.

All these ideas are mistaken.  Pragmatism is neither a revolt against philosophy nor a revolution in philosophy, except in so far as it is an important evolution of philosophy.  It is a collective name for the most modern solution of puzzles which have impeded philosophical progress from time immemorial, and it has arisen naturally in the course of philosophical reflection.  It answers the big problems which are as familiar to the scientist and the theologian as to the metaphysician and epistemologist, and which are both intelligible and interesting to common sense.

The following questions stand out:  (1) Can the possibility of knowledge be maintained against Hume and other sceptics?  Certainly, if it can be shown that ‘The New Psychology’ has antiquated the analysis of mind which Hume assumed and ‘British Associationism’ respectfully continued to uphold. (2) Seeing that inclination and volition indisputably play a part in the acceptance of all beliefs, scientific and religious, what is the logical significance of this fact?  This yields the problem ’The Will to Believe,’ and more generally of ’the place of Will in cognition.’ (3) Is there no