There can be no doubt that we do not approach the data of perception in an attitude of quiescent resignation.  Our desires and needs equip us with assumptions and ‘first principles,’ which originate from within, not from without.  But how precisely should this mental contribution to knowledge be conceived?  In the last chapter of his Psychology James suggested that the mind’s organization is essentially biological.  It has evolved according to sound Darwinian principles, and in so doing the fittest of its ‘variations’ have survived.  But were these variations quite fortuitous?  May they not have been purposive responses to the stimulation of environment?  Can logic have been invented like saws and ships for purposes of human service?  These are some of the stimulating questions which James’s work in Psychology has suggested.

FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote A:  Not in Bradley’s “Logic.”]

[Footnote B:  This is the substance of the doctrine of ’The Will to Believe.’]

CHAPTER III

WILL IN COGNITION

The new psychology of James was bound to produce a new theory of knowledge, and though it did not actually explore this problem, it contained several valuable suggestions upon the subject.  For instance, in a brief passage discussing ‘The Relations of Belief and Will,’ James pointed out that belief is essentially an attitude of the will towards an idea, adding that in order to acquire a belief ’we need only in cold blood act as if the thing in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real’ (ii., p. 321).  This passage is an outline of the doctrine of ‘The Will to Believe,’ which he was afterwards to develop so forcibly.

Again, in his last chapter, James criticized the doctrine of Spencer that all the principles of thought, all its general truths and axioms, were derived from impressions of the external world.  He argued, on the other hand, that such ways of looking at phenomena must originate in the mind, and be prior to the experience which confirms them.  Without digging further into the character of this mental contribution to knowledge, James contented himself with the suggestion that the use of these axiomatic principles might be construed in Darwinian style as a ‘variation’ surviving by its fitness, thus introducing into his account of mental process the important idea that thinking might be tested by its vital value.

What if knowledge be neither a dull submission to dictation from without nor an unexplained necessity of thought?  What if it be a bold adventure, an experimental sally of a Will to live, to know and to control reality?  What if its principles were frankly risky, and their truth had to be desired before it was tested and assured?  In a word, what if first principles were to begin with postulates? Thus the way is paved from the new psychology to a new theory of knowledge.  A third alternative to the banal dilemma of ‘empiricism’ or ‘apriorism’ suggests itself.