to me was in such a proper form, that I had no objection to accept it.  The invitation which he sent was worded in quite a different form from that of the invitation which I received on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar.  In the circumstances I had determined to undergo all risks (at the time of the Delhi Durbar) and, if necessary, to sacrifice all my possessions and my own life, but not to accept such an invitation as was sent to me for coming to join the Delhi Durbar.”

These thing are far too serious for me or any of us to indulge in controversy upon, but it is a satisfaction to be able to point out to the House that the policy we instructed the Governor-General to follow, has so far worked extremely well.

I will go back to the Army.  Last year when I referred to this subject, I told the House that it would be my object to remove any defects that I and those who advise me might discover in the Army system, and more especially, of course, in the schemes of Lord Kitchener.  Since then, with the assistance of two very important Committees, well qualified by expert military knowledge, I came to the conclusion that an improved equipment was required.  Hon. Gentlemen may think that my opinion alone would not be worth much; but, after all, civilians have got to decide these questions, and, provided that they arm themselves with the expert knowledge of military authorities, it is rightly their voice that settles the matter.  Certain changes were necessary in the allocation of units in order to enable the troops to be better trained, and therefore our final conclusion was that the special military expenditure shown in the financial statement must go on for some years more.  But the House will see that we have arranged to cut down the rate of the annual grant, and we have taken care—­and this, I think, ought to be set down to our credit—­that every estimate for every item included in the programme shall be submitted to vigilant scrutiny here as well as in India.  I have no prepossession in favour of military expenditure, but the pressure of facts, the pressure of the situation, the possibilities of contingencies that may arise, seem obviously to make it impossible for any Government or any Minister to acquiesce in the risks on the Indian frontier.  We have to consider not only our position with respect to foreign Powers on the Indian frontier, but the exceedingly complex questions that arise in connection with the turbulent border tribes.  All these things make it impossible—­I say nothing about internal conditions—­for any Government or any Minister with a sense of responsibility to cancel or to deal with the military programme in any high-handed or cavalier way.