Had the minister of Spain offered an unqualified pledge that the treaty should be ratified by his Sovereign on being made acquainted with the explanations which had been given by this Government, there would have been a strong motive for accepting and submitting it to the Senate for their advice and consent, rather than to resort to other measures for redress, however justifiable and proper; but he gives no such pledge; oil the contrary, he declares explicitly that the refusal of this Government to relinquish the right of judging and acting for itself hereafter, according to circumstances, in regard to the Spanish colonies, a right common to all nations, has rendered it impossible for him under his instructions to make such engagement.  He thinks that his Sovereign will be induced by his communications to ratify the treaty, but still he leaves him free either to adopt that measure or to decline it.  He admits that the other objections are essentially removed and will not in themselves prevent the ratification, provided the difficulty on the third point is surmounted.  The result, therefore, is that the treaty is declared to have no obligation whatever; that its ratification is made to depend not on the considerations which led to its adoption and the conditions which it contains, but on a new article unconnected with it, respecting which a new negotiation must be opened, of indefinite duration and doubtful issue.

Under this view of the subject the course to be pursued would appear to be direct and obvious if the affairs of Spain had remained in the state in which they were when this minister sailed.  But it is known that an important change has since taken place in the Government of that country which can not fail to be sensibly felt in its intercourse with other nations.  The minister of Spain has essentially declared his inability to act in consequence of that change.  With him, however, under his present powers nothing could be done.  The attitude of the United States must now be assumed on full consideration of what is due to their rights, their interest and honor, without regard to the powers or incidents of the late mission.  We may at pleasure occupy the territory which was intended and provided by the late treaty as an indemnity for losses so long since sustained by our citizens; but still, nothing could be settled definitively without a treaty between the two nations.  Is this the time to make the pressure?  If the United States were governed by views of ambition and aggrandizement, many strong reasons might be given in its favor; but they have no objects of that kind to accomplish, none which are not founded in justice and which can be injured by forbearance.  Great hope is entertained that this change will promote the happiness of the Spanish nation.  The good order, moderation, and humanity which have characterized the movement are the best guaranties of its success.

The United States would not be justified in their own estimation should they take any step to disturb its harmony.  When the Spanish Government is completely organized on the principles of this change, as it is expected it soon will be, there is just ground to presume that our differences with Spain will be speedily and satisfactorily settled.