If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities against the entry of large ships of war into our bays and rivers, they would be of little use for the defense of New Orleans, since that city can not be approached so near, either by the Mississippi or in any other direction, by such vessels for them to make an attack on it.  In the Gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which had been acquired since these works were decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river into which large ships of war can enter.  As a defense, therefore, against an attack from such vessels extensive works would be altogether unnecessary either at Mobile Point or at Dauphine Island, since sloops of war only can navigate the deepest channel.  But it is not for that purpose alone that these works are intended.  It is to provide also against a formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to shake the foundation of our system.  Should such small works be erected, and such an invasion take place, they would be sure to fall at once into the hands of the invaders and to be turned against us.

Whether the acquisition of Florida may be considered as affording an inducement to make any change in the position or strength of these works is a circumstance which also merits attention.  From the view which I have taken of the subject I am of opinion that it should not.  The defense of New Orleans and of the river Mississippi against a powerful invasion being one of the great objects of such extensive works, that object would be essentially abandoned if they should be established eastward of the bay of Mobile, since the force to be collected in them would be placed at too great a distance to allow the cooperation necessary for those purposes between it and that at the city; in addition to which, it may be observed that by carrying them to Pensacola or farther to the east that bay would fall immediately, in case of such invasion, into the hands of the enemy, whereby such cooperation would be rendered utterly impossible, and the State of Alabama would also be left wholly unprotected.

With a view to such formidable invasion, of which we should never lose sight, and of the great objects to which it would be directed, I think that very strong works at some point within the Gulf of Mexico will be found indispensable.  I think also that those works ought to be established at the bay of Mobile—­one at Mobile Point and the other on Dauphine Island—­whereby the enemy would be excluded and the complete command of that bay, with all the advantages attending it, be secured to ourselves.  In the case of such invasion, it will, it is presumed, be deemed necessary to collect at some point other than at New Orleans a strong force, capable of moving in any direction and affording aid to any part which may be attacked; and, in my judgment, no position presents so many advantages as a point of rendezvous for such force as the mouth of that bay.  The fortification at