and of their own free will, nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions.  The former course no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich, and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen.  So liberal a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in politics.  On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain.  In democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in the army, so that in a way they get it back again.  But in monarchies one set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises, engage in politics,—­the principal pursuits by which fortunes are secured,—­and a different set are under arms and draw pay.

“This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will cause you trouble.  Here is another.  It is by all means essential that whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty.  The majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example, but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government.  Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate.  For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary to the wish of the ruling power.  If, again, any are convicted, they will believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which you are responsible.  However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be compelled to chastise many of the peers,—­and this is not favorable,—­and you will certainly be thought to be setting some of them right in anger rather than in justice.  No one believes that those who have the power to use compulsion can execute judgment with justice, but everybody thinks that out of shame they spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of government in front of the truth, in order that under the legitimate name of court they may fulfill their desire.  This is what happens in monarchies.  In democracies, when any one is accused of committing a private wrong, he is made defendant in a private suit before judges who are his equals:  or, if he is accused for a public crime, such a man has empaneled a jury of his peers, whoever the lot shall designate.  It is easier for men to bear their decisions, since they do not think that any verdict rendered is due to the power of the judge or has been wrung from him as a favor.[1]